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Abstract(
(
This!thesis!considers!enforcement!strategies!in!the!context!of!principalFagent!
relationships!in!industries!where!there!is!a!high!risk!for!negative!externalities.!The!
2010!Deepwater(Horizon!oil!spill—the!largest!accidental!spill!of!all!time—is!used!as!
a!case!study!to!highlight!the!regulatory!issues!that!arise!in!industries!with!the!
potential!for!farFreaching!and!negative!impacts!on!society.!An!inFdepth!analysis!of!
the!events!surrounding!the!disaster!makes!it!clear!that!complex!principalFagent!
relationships!between!agencies!and!firms!are!common!in!the!industry,!as!are!!!
problems!with!conflicting!objectives,!improper!incentives,!and!moral!hazard.!As!
these!are!all!features!of!the!principalFagent!model,!this!economic!analysis!tool!is!
used!to!provide!insight!for!resolving!issues!and!proposing!a!new!optimal!
enforcement!strategy!for!the!industry.!As!many!features!of!the!offshore!drilling!
industry!central!to!the!creation!of!an!enforcement!strategy!are!common!in!other!
industries!with!high!risk!for!negative!externalities,!the!recommendations!in!this!
thesis!can!be!applied!generally!to!these!other!industries!as!well.!
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Chapter(I(
Introduction(
(
!!

On!April!20,!2010,!BP’s!exploratory!Macondo!well!blew!out,!resulting!in!an!

explosion!on!board!the!drilling!rig!Deepwater(Horizon!and!the!largest!accidental!oil!
spill!in!history.!The!oil!flowed!into!the!waters!of!the!Gulf!of!Mexico!for!87!days!
before!the!well!was!sealed!off,!with!an!estimated!4.9!million!barrels!spilled.!In!
addition!to!the!casualties!on!board!the!rig,!the!explosion!and!consequent!spill!
caused!environmental!damage!to!the!Gulf!and!nearby!shorelines!that!is!still!being!
realized!today!(National!Commission,!2011).!For!the!offshore!drilling!industry,!
environmentalists,!and!citizens!of!Gulf!Coast!states,!the!Deepwater(Horizon!disaster!
became!a!symbol!of!the!worst!caseQscenario—of!what!should!never!be!endured!
again.!
!

Investigations!both!internal!and!external!began,!and!individuals!on!board!the!

rig,!as!well!as!the!involved!companies!were!put!on!trial!for!various!environmental!
and!safety!infractions.!As!the!operator!and!leaseholder!of!the!drill!site,!BP!bore!most!
of!the!blame.!However,!Transocean,!the!provider!of!the!rig!and!its!crew;!Halliburton,!
the!manufacturer!of!the!cement!that!failed!to!seal!the!well;!and!even!the!
government,!responsible!for!regulation!of!the!industry;!were!also!held!at!fault.!
Liability!for!damages!incurred!was!spread!thin,!with!fingers!pointed!by!all!parties!in!
every!direction!but!their!own.!!

!

1!

In!order!to!prevent!accidents!like!Deepwater(Horizon!from!happening!again,!
an!optimal!enforcement!strategy!must!be!developed!to!implement!a!more!strict!and!
effective!safety!culture!on!all!levels!of!the!offshore!drilling!industry.!To!determine!
such!a!strategy,!the!events!leading!up!to!the!blowout!of!the!Macondo!well!and!
subsequent!explosion!and!oil!spill!need!to!be!examined!to!ascertain!what!went!
wrong!and!who!was!at!fault.!A!number!of!investigations!from!various!perspectives!
are!available,!but!each!must!be!carefully!evaluated!with!an!eye!for!biases!based!on!
authorship!in!order!to!determine!what!truly!happened.!Once!a!clear!picture!of!the!
shortcomings!in!the!industry!with!a!focus!on!preventative!measures!is!obtained,!
economics!can!be!used!as!a!framework!for!reworking!the!current!system!and!
devising!potential!mechanisms!to!constitute!an!optimal!enforcement!strategy.!
!This!thesis!examines!the!relationships!between!the!involved!parties!through!
the!theoretical!perspective!of!the!principalQagent!model.!!The!model!examines!the!
relationship!between!a!principal!(contractor)!and!agent!(the!contracted)!and!the!
inherent!conflicts!of!interest!that!exist!between!the!two.!The!principal!and!agent!
confront!the!issue!of!agreeing!to!a!contract!that!provides!appropriate!incentives!to!
both!maximize!profits!and!to!produce!an!efficient!level!of!effort.!The!conflicts!of!
interest!exist!in!that!the!principal!requires!full!effort!from!the!agent!to!maximize!
firm!profit,!while!the!agent!needs!to!exert!enough!effort!to!meet!contractual!
obligations!without!overexerting!himself.!This,!combined!with!asymmetric!
information!between!the!parties,!leads!to!problems!with!contract!design!regarding!
incentives!and!production!of!efficient!outcomes.!!

!
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Although!extensive!literature!on!the!principalQagent!model!exists,!very!little!
deals!with!industries!with!high!risk!for!negative!externalities,!or!more!specifically,!
the!offshore!drilling!industry.!Since!the!Deepwater(Horizon!spill!occurred!recently,!
and!was!on!a!scale!greater!than!any!spill!before,!it!provides!new!insight!into!the!
adjustments!that!must!be!made!in!the!industry!to!avoid!worstQcase!scenarios!such!
as!this,!and!to!alleviate!the!damages!they!cause.!Additionally,!there!is!insufficient!
literature!that!deals!with!potential!resolutions!of!the!specific!shortcomings!in!the!
industry!that!were!highlighted!by!the!Deepwater(Horizon!disaster.!Problems!within!
the!offshore!drilling!industry!as!it!today!exists!have!yet!to!be!tackled!in!light!of!the!
principalQagent!relationships!that!pervade!it,!and!with!this!fresh!take!on!the!issues,!
possible!components!of!an!optimal!enforcement!strategy!can!be!proposed.!
Current!enforcement!strategies!in!the!offshore!drilling!industry!do!not!
provide!companies!with!the!incentive!to!spend!resources!on!promotion!of!a!safety!
culture.!Additionally,!in!an!industry!like!offshore!drilling,!there!exists!the!issue!of!
moral!hazard.!Onshore!regulators!have!no!way!of!knowing!exactly!what!effort!levels!
are!being!exerted!by!employees!on!oil!rigs!at!all!times.!Safety!regulations!are!in!
place,!but!employees!can!evade!many!of!these.!Due!to!the!nature!of!the!problems!in!
the!industry,!a!study!of!the!principalQagent!model!and!how!issues!with!these!
relationships!are!resolved!can!reveal!suggestions!for!change.!PrincipalQagent!
relationships!exist!both!between!and!within!companies!in!the!industry,!and!
appropriate!alterations!on!all!levels!will!serve!to!improve!regulation!and!safety!
throughout.!By!identifying!several!sets!of!these!relationships:!characterizing!the!
government!as!a!principal!to!BP;!BP!as!a!principal!to!the!subcontracted!companies!

!

3!

Transocean!and!Halliburton;!and!BP!and!Transocean!as!principals!to!their!
employees;!incentives!for!resolution!of!their!lack!of!safety!precautions!can!be!
determined.!
Many!industries!that!operate!with!a!high!risk!for!negative!externalities!are!
rife!with!principalQagent!relationships!between!enforcers!and!companies,!as!well!as!
within!and!between!profitQmaximizing!companies!themselves.!Thus,!with!lessons!
learned!through!a!review!of!the!Deepwater(Horizon!case!study,!detailed!knowledge!
of!the!principalQagent!model!and!relevant!contracting!issues,!and!strategies!for!
enforcement!suggested!by!economists!in!related!literature,!many!of!the!
recommendations!made!in!this!thesis!can!be!generally!applied!to!other!industries!
that!have!high!risk!for!negative!externalities.!!
With!the!complex!and!costly!investigations!and!legal!proceedings!that!have!
surrounded!this!incident,!it!is!clear!that!change!is!necessary.!The!way!in!which!
companies!are!regulated!needs!to!be!simplified,!and!as!a!regulator,!the!government!
needs!to!have!a!more!active!role!in!enforcing!its!policies.!With!strong!topQdown!
enforcement,!involved!companies!should!feel!the!burden!of!responsibility!to!enforce!
safety!policies!internally!as!well.!But!how!can!an!optimal!enforcement!strategy!for!
promotion!of!a!stronger!safety!culture!in!the!industry!be!designed?!
Without!an!inQdepth!analysis!of!the!largest!accidental!oil!spill!of!all!time,!
Deepwater(Horizon,!in!light!of!the!principalQagent!model!and!its!issues!with!
incentives!between!contractors,!there!will!be!a!lack!of!change!in!the!offshore!drilling!
industry!that!may!result!in!a!similar!accident!occurring!again.!Offshore!drilling!in!
the!United!States!happens!almost!exclusively!in!the!Gulf!of!Mexico,!and!this!area!has!

!
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suffered!enough!consequences!from!the!ineffective!regulation!of!these!highly!risky!
operations.!Because!other!industries!can!serve!to!benefit!from!this!kind!of!study!as!
well,!the!research!gains!even!more!value.!Using!this!framework,!recommendations!
for!components!of!an!optimal!enforcement!strategy!can!be!determined!to!promote!
socially!beneficial!change!in!the!offshore!drilling!industry,!as!well!as!other!
industries!with!high!risk!for!negative!externalities.!!
!
!

!

!
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Chapter(II(
Case(Study:(Deepwater(Horizon1(
!
To(fully(understand(the(shortcomings(within(the(offshore(oil(drilling(industry,(an(
examination(of(the(most(prominent(and(devastating(oil(spill(in(history(is(critical.(
Beginning(with(a(history(of(the(regulation(of(offshore(drilling(in(the(United(States(and(
background(information(on(key(players(in(the(industry,(this(chapter(highlights(
problems(that(have(persisted(in(the(enforcement(of(safety(protocols(and(transparency(
between(involved(agencies(since(its(beginnings.((Given(this(context,(an(inCdepth(
analysis(of(the(events(surrounding(the(Deepwater!Horizon(disaster(allows(for(flaws(in(
the(organization(of(the(industry(and(implementation(of(crucial(regulations(to(be(
clearly(determined.(
!
2.1(A(History(of(the(Regulation(of(Offshore(Drilling(in(the(United(States(
Offshore!oil!drilling!began!in!the!1890s,!but!with!time!there!have!been!
significant!advances!in!the!manner!in!which!it!has!been!conducted!and!regulated.!
Innovation!in!the!industry!has!largely!been!due!to!an!increased!demand!for!oil!over!
the!past!century,!as!companies!have!strived!to!find!new!ways!to!reach!this!growing!
consumerQbase.!In!the!most!recent!developments,!the!drilling!industry!has!moved!
further!and!further!offshore!into!deeper!waters,!changing!the!risks!involved!in!
drilling!operations!(National!Commission,!2011).!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1!Section!2.12!of!this!Chapter!is!an!alphabetized!Glossary!of!technological!and!industryQspecific!terms!
for!the!reader’s!reference.!
!
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The!Constitution’s!Property!Clause!gives!ownership!of!offshore!natural!
resources!to!the!nation,!and!deems!the!federal!government!responsible!for!
managing!and!protecting!said!resources.!The!Outer!Continental!Shelf!Lands!Act!of!
1953!was!the!foundation!for!federal!regulation!of!offshore!oil!and!gas!development.!
The!Act!gives!the!government!the!conflicting!responsibilities!of!promoting!offshore!
drilling,!while!at!the!same!time!regulating!it!to!protect!the!environment.!For!
example,!money!from!lease!sales,!rents,!and!royalties!goes!to!the!U.S.!Treasury,!
making!acceleration!of!the!industry!in!the!government’s!interest.!!In!terms!of!the!
environment,!the!Act!includes!only!a!limited!number!of!concerns,!and!the!Secretary!
of!the!Interior!has!discretion!over!how!much!consideration!to!give!these.!
Additionally,!the!timeframe!provided!for!approval!of!drilling!projects!does!not!allow!
for!a!thorough!evaluation!of!these!concerns!(National!Commission,!2011).!!
Offshore!drilling!is!a!complicated!process!that!requires!contracting!many!
different!services!from!many!different!companies.!Because!of!this,!delay!in!one!step!
can!cause!challenging!delays!elsewhere,!increasing!time!pressures!for!each!task.!For!
example,!drilling!vessels!used!to!be!contracted!on!dayQrates,!creating!incentive!to!
get!the!job!done!as!quickly!as!possible.!Government!agencies!have!a!history!of!
contributing!to!a!timesaving!culture,!as!they!often!overlook!“corner!cutting”!
strategies.!For!instance,!the!U.S.!Geological!Survey!has!granted!oil!companies!
waivers!from!complying!with!orders!and!has!failed!to!conduct!regular!and!thorough!
inspections!of!drilling!sites!(National!Commission,!2011).!
In!the!early!1970s,!conflicting!ideas!regarding!the!offshore!drilling!industry!
arose!especially!prominently.!On!the!environmental!front,!the!Santa!Barbara!oil!spill!

!
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in!1969!prompted!new!legislation!for!the!first!time!since!1953.!The!National!
Environmental!Policy!Act!(NEPA)!dramatically!increased!the!federal!role!in!
oversight!for!environmental!protection!and!resource!conservation,!with!the!
requirement!of!“environmental!impact!statements”!from!oil!companies.!The!federal!
courts!applied!requirements!from!the!Act!strictly,!and!about!20!additional!
environmental!laws!were!made!in!this!decade!(National!Commission,!2011).!
Alternatively,!the!OPEC!oil!embargo!in!1973!prompted!more!new!policies!to!
be!instituted!to!encourage!oil!production!as!Americans!turned!away!from!foreign!
dependency!for!energy.!The!Department!of!Energy!was!created!in!1977,!and!the!
National!Energy!Act!was!passed!in!1978.!In!1982,!the!Secretary!of!the!Interior!
created!the!Minerals!Management!Service!(MMS),!with!the!goal!of!expanding!
offshore!drilling!to!promote!domestic!energy!supplies.!The!agency!would!regulate!
these!sites!as!well!as!collect!billions!of!dollars!in!revenue!for!the!U.S.!Treasury!
through!lease!sale!royalty!payments,!which!in!the!previous!decade!had!become!its!
second!largest!revenue!source.!Even!so,!the!government!felt!the!offshore!drilling!
industry!could!provide!more!profit,!and!MMS!was!charged!with!reforming!royalty!
collection.!Soon!after,!the!government!created!a!program!to!lease!“acreQwide”!
drilling!areas!rather!than!just!tracts!of!interest,!resulting!in!a!large!increase!in!
supply!and!lower!prices!for!leases.!These!simultaneous!and!conflicting!restrictions!
and!expansions!of!offshore!drilling!resulted!in!difficulties!in!enforcing!any!policies!at!
all!(National!Commission,!2011).!As!with!the!oil!industry,!MMS!had!the!“incentive!to!
promote!offshore!drilling!in!sharp!tension!with!its!mandate!to!ensure!safe!drilling!
and!environmental!protection”!(National!Commission,!2011,!p.!72).!

!
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From!later!in!the!1970s!through!the!1980s,!more!spill!related!disasters!
occurred!and!the!government!continued!to!change!and!strengthen!enforcement!
policies.!The!Outer!Continental!Shelf!Lands!Act!Amendments!of!1978!transformed!
federal!offshore!leasing,!giving!most!of!the!power!to!the!Secretary!of!the!Interior.!
Again,!dueling!responsibilities!were!to!“obtain!a!proper!balance!between!the!
potential!for!environmental!damage,!the!potential!for!discovery!of!oil!and!gas,!and!
the!potential!for!adverse!impact!on!the!coastal!zone”!(National!Commission,!2011,!p.!
77).!The!Secretary!from!the!Coast!Guard!department!was!given!control!over!safety!
regulations,!charged!with!using!the!best!technology!available,!but!also!taking!cost!
into!consideration.!This!Act!was!the!first!of!several!laws!that!included!an!exemption!
for!Gulf!of!Mexico!leases:!development!and!production!plans!would!not!be!
necessary!for!these,!which!in!effect!exempted!them!from!NEPA’s!requirement!for!
environmental!impact!statements!(National!Commission,!2011).!!
During!this!time!period,!the!frequency!of!spills!did!not!decline,!but!
consequences!from!the!spills!became!less!severe.!This!was!mostly!attributed!to!
improvements!in!technological!design!and!equipment!rather!than!in!human!error!
and!management.!In!order!to!save!time,!operators!started!to!form!alliances!and!
contract!out!work!for!different!parts!of!the!drilling!process,!including!outsourcing!
more!and!more!research!and!design!to!specialists.!This!largely!improved!
technology,!but!also!resulted!in!fewer!personnel!in!the!drilling!companies!with!
knowledge!about!technology!development!and!deployment.!In!a!technologically!
complex!industry!full!of!many!unknowns,!high!costs,!and!risks,!this!put!a!strain!on!
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the!level!of!expertise!of!those!actually!performing!and!overseeing!drilling!
operations!(National!Commission,!2011).!!
By!the!1990s,!the!Gulf!of!Mexico!was!almost!the!only!location!in!the!United!
States!where!offshore!drilling!was!still!legal.!“Ultra!deepwater”!drilling!was!
developing,!and!innovation!was!constant.!With!such!drastic!changes,!many!old!
drilling!platforms!became!essentially!useless!and!were!completely!abandoned.!
Deepwater!exploration!brought!new!environments!that!presented!technological!
challenges.!Drillers’!jobs!were!now!more!demanding,!as!they!were!dealing!with!
unknown!territory!as!well!as!a!greater!volume!of!mud!and!drilling!fluids!(National!
Commission,!2011).!!
The!Deepwater!Royalty!Relief!Act!of!1995!relaxed!access!of!leases!in!the!Gulf,!
allowing!for!more!oil!companies!to!get!involved!in!deepwater!drilling.!The!trend!
away!from!internal!expertise!continued!as!oil!companies!merged!and!grew,!
providing!additional!finances!and!more!longQterm!growth!strategies!with!higher!
returns,!but!also!higher!risks.!The!oil!and!gas!industry!failed!to!match!money!spent!
on!development!and!production!with!money!spent!on!drilling!safety,!oil!spill!
containment!technology,!and!response!planning!(National!Commission,!2011).!
There!was!a!“fail[ure]!to!ensure!that!agency!regulators!had!the!resources!necessary!
to!exercise…the!political!autonomy!needed!to!overcome!the!powerful!commercial!
interests!that!opposed!more!stringent!safety!regulation”!(National!Commission,!
2011,!p.!83).!From!2008!through!2010,!the!government!and!oil!industry!were!
“earning!even!greater!revenues!from!everQmore!ambitious!exploration”!(National!
Commission,!2011,!p.!68).!

!

10!

2.2(The(Risks(of(Deepwater(Drilling(!
Drilling!for!oil!requires!tapping!into!porous!and!hydrocarbonQfilled!rock,!
known!in!the!industry!as!the!“pay!zone”.!Wells!drilled!in!deeper!waters!have!higher!
pressure!from!the!rocks!above,!and!drillers!must!balance!this!pressure!by!pushing!
hydrocarbons!into!the!well,!while!also!exerting!counterQpressure!from!inside!the!
well.!This!is!a!very!risky!process—there!cannot!be!too!much!counterQpressure,!but!
too!little!counterQpressure!can!lead!to!an!uncontrolled!intrusion!of!hydrocarbons!
into!the!well!and!a!subsequent!blowout.!Despite!all!the!room!for!profit,!the!field!of!
deepwater!drilling!is!still!largely!unexplored!and!full!of!technical!challenges.!For!
example,!blowout!preventer!technologies!need!to!be!updated!to!deal!with!new!well!
conditions.!Additionally,!the!environmental!and!geological!conditions!of!deepwater!
locations!are!mostly!unknown!(National!Commission,!2011).!
!
2.3(A(History(of(the(Minerals(Management(Service((MMS)(
!

The!Minerals!Management!Service!(MMS)!was!created!in!1982!with!the!

conflicting!responsibilities!of!enforcing!safety!and!environmental!protection!and!
promoting!offshore!drilling.!In!terms!of!environmental!protection,!The!National!
Oceanic!and!Atmospheric!Administration!(NOAA)!was!authorized!to!make!
recommendations!to!MMS!about!environmental!impacts.!However,!MMS!was!not!
required!to!follow!this!advice,!and!thus,!NOAA!spent!minimal!time!and!resources!
making!their!recommendations.!No!MMS!director!ever!possessed!strong!technical!
abilities!or!expertise!in!regards!to!drilling!safety,!which!may!be!why!a!general!
deficiency!in!these!areas!persisted!throughout!the!company.!Additionally,!the!
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midrange!salaries!of!federal!engineers!were!too!low!to!attract!individuals!with!a!
qualified!level!of!experience!in!the!field.!Other!problems!in!the!agency!included!
internal!management!shortcomings!paired!with!a!lack!of!communication!between!
regional!offices!(National!Commission,!2011).!!
In!terms!of!safety!regulations,!the!agency!created!hundreds!of!pages!of!
technical!requirements!for!pollution!prevention!and!control,!drilling,!wellQ
completion!operations,!oil!and!gas!wellQworkovers,!production!and!safety!systems,!
platforms!and!structures,!pipelines,!well!production,!and!wellQcontrol!and!Q
production!safety!training.!To!assess!compliance!with!these!requirements,!MMS!was!
to!conduct!unscheduled!inspections!of!offshore!drilling!operations!using!a!national!
checklist.!The!actual!inspections!only!covered!a!subset!of!the!list,!80%!of!which!had!
to!do!with!safety.!There!was!no!oil!and!gas!inspection!certification!program!or!exam!
required!for!inspectors!to!become!certified,!and!many!inspectors!simply!planned!to!
learn!about!the!drilling!industry!while!at!the!facilities!conducting!inspections.!In!an!
evaluation!by!the!Outer!Continental!Shelf!Safety!Oversight!Board,!it!was!determined!
that!“MMS!lack[ed]!a!formal,!bureauQwide!compilation!of!rules,!regulations,!policies,!
or!practices!pertinent!to!inspections,![and!did!not]!have!a!comprehensive!handbook!
addressing!inspector!roles!and!responsibilities”!(National!Commission,!2011,!p.!94).!!
In!1990,!the!Marine!Board!of!National!Research!Council!determined!that!
MMS!needed!to!place!less!emphasis!on!finding!“potential!instances!of!nonQ
compliance”!(National!Commission,!2011,!p.!86),!and!more!on!detecting!accidentQ
prone!situations.!The!agency!was!also!required!to!update!their!program!in!
accordance!with!changes!going!on!in!offshore!drilling!environments,!but!in!the!
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1990s,!the!resources!available!to!them!declined!and!federal!regulations!increasingly!
lagged!behind.!The!United!States!Coast!Guard,!with!responsibility!over!the!vessels!
and!facilities!working!on!the!Outer!Continental!Shelf,!was!also!facing!budgetary!
restraints!at!this!time!and!hadn’t!majorly!revised!marineQsafety!rules!since!1982.!
Ultimately,!the!overlaps!in!responsibility!between!MMS!and!the!Coast!Guard!led!to!a!
shortage!of!resources!for!both!(National!Commission,!2011).!
Lack!of!due!diligence!was!evidenced!in!many!ways.!Although!third!party!tests!
found!blowout!preventers!on!drilling!rigs!had!a!high!possibility!of!failure!under!
deepwater!conditions,!MMS!started!testing!them!less!frequently!based!simply!on!
industry!claims!that!they!were!very!reliable.!Eventually,!MMS!did!conclude!that!
operators!were!basing!their!representations!of!the!blowout!preventers’!
effectiveness!on!inconsistent!information,!however!they!never!revised!blowout!
preventer!regulations.!Despite!the!fact!that!so!many!third!party!contractors!were!
getting!involved!in!the!drilling!industry,!MMS!did!not!update!regulations!to!account!
for!this.!Additionally,!the!issue!of!conflicting!responsibilities!remained:!MMS!
directors!continuously!acknowledged!that!royalty!issues!took!up!most!of!their!time,!
taking!away!from!regulatory!oversight!duties!(National!Commission,!2011).!!
In!1996,!MMS!implemented!a!safety!and!environmental!management!
program!holding!drilling!site!operators!responsible!for!participating.!However,!only!
voluntary!compliance!was!required!because!they!wanted!to!be!seen!as!a!partner!to!
the!industry,!rather!than!an!enemy.!Regulatory!incentives!such!as!this!were!met!
with!a!lot!of!opposition!from!various!federal!agencies!and!oil!companies,!with!the!
argument!that!they!were!too!burdensome!(National!Commission,!2011).!!
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Another!problem!with!MMS!as!a!regulator!arose!due!to!technicalities.!As!desk!
job!employees!working!typical!office!hours,!regulators!could!not!keep!pace!with!
aroundQtheQclock!oil!drilling.!OnQcall!responsibilities!were!assigned!out!to!senior!
engineers!who!did!not!even!have!full!access!to!MMS!databases!due!to!security!
purposes.!These!complications!led!to!operators!from!oil!companies!“shopping!
around”!until!they!could!find!an!approving!engineer!for!each!of!their!projects!
(National!Commission,!2011).!
!
2.4(A(Condensed(History(of(British(Petroleum((BP)(
!

British!Petroleum!(BP)!was!founded!as!AngloQPersian!Oil!Company!in!1909,!

and!became!BP!in!1954.!With!decades!of!expansion!and!success,!the!company!made!
a!name!for!itself!in!the!global!energy!market.!As!oil!drilling!developed!over!time,!the!
company!did!as!well.!In!1989,!the!executive!Vice!President!of!Sohio!(BP’s!American!
subsidiary)!reorganized!BP!around!a!rigid!performance!ethic!and!highQrisk,!highQ
return!opportunities.!Advances!in!technology!encouraged!the!exploration!of!new!
and!risky!prospects,!since!out!in!deepwater!these!risks!were!often!rewarded!with!
large!oil!deposits.!In!the!early!2000s,!BP!held!the!most!acreage!in!the!Gulf!and!oneQ
third!of!deepwater!reserves.!At!any!given!time,!the!company!had!numerous!ongoing!
projects,!each!of!which!required!coordination!between!different!contractors,!as!well!
as!investment!before!they!could!become!profitable!(National!Commission,!2011).!
!

A!company!involved!in!a!dangerous!industry,!BP!has!always!had!a!

questionable!safety!reputation.!For!example,!in!1989,!the!Exxon(Valdez!spill!was!the!
largest!oil!spill!in!history.!BP!had!a!controlling!interest!in!Alyeska,!the!company!that!
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failed!to!respond!quickly!or!effectively!to!the!oil!spill.!BP’s!poor!safety!reputation!
extended!beyond!drilling!operations!and!included!other!questionable!decisions.!In!
2002,!BP!falsified!inspections!of!fuel!tanks!at!a!Los!Angeles!refinery,!and!in!2007,!BP!
pled!guilty!to!a!criminal!violation!of!the!Clean!Water!Act!to!resolve!criminal!liability!
relating!to!pipeline!leaks!of!crude!oil!in!Alaska.!Explosions!and!fires!at!a!BP!Texas!
City!Refinery!in!2005!were!caused!by!organizational!and!safety!deficiencies!at!all!
levels!of!BP!(Cleveland,!2013).!
!

!

2.5(The(Macondo(Well(Project((
In!the!past!decade,!MMS!divided!the!Mississippi!Canyon,!an!undersea!area!in!
the!northQcentral!Gulf!of!Mexico,!into!numbered!federal!oil!and!gas!lease!blocks.!On!
March!19,!2008,!the!agency!leased!Mississippi!Canyon!Block!252!to!BP.!The!lease,!
Lease!Sale!206,!would!last!for!ten!years,!beginning!on!June!1,!2008.!BP!was!the!lease!
operator,!with!65%!control!(BP,!2010).!
Upon!obtaining!the!lease,!BP!began!crafting!an!exploration!plan!to!drill!the!
Macondo!well.!The!MMS!personnel!in!charge!of!reviewing!permits!and!requests!
from!BP!did!not!have!any!guidelines!or!requirements!for!evaluation!of!aspects!
critical!for!well!safety.!However,!with!a!lack!of!internal!expertise,!it!is!unlikely!they!
would!have!been!able!to!properly!interpret!this!information,!had!it!existed.!Due!to!
the!categorical!exclusion!of!leases!in!the!Gulf!of!Mexico,!there!was!no!NEPA!review!
of!the!well’s!permitting.!In!fact,!no!agency!gave!significant!attention!to!any!federal!
laws!in!terms!of!environmental!mandates!for!this!lease!block!(National!Commission,!
2011).!!
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MMS!approved!BP’s!final!exploration!plan!on!April!6,!2009,!and!approved!an!
Application(for(Permit(to(Drill(on!May!22,!2009.!Several!modifications!were!made!
throughout!the!drilling!process,!which!is!typical!of!this!kind!of!operation!(BP,!2010).!
To!comply!with!the!Oil!Pollution!Act!of!1990,!BP!created!an!Oil!Spill!Response!Plan,!
which!was!also!approved!by!MMS,!despite!its!lack!of!attention!to!detail.!For!instance,!
the!plan!included!text!directly!copied!from!the!NOAA!website!that!mentioned!sea!
life!inexistent!in!the!Gulf.!MMS!did!not!further!analyze!any!part!of!the!plan!(National!
Commission,!2011).!!
The!BP!Macondo!well!engineering!team,!BP!subsurface!team,!and!selected!
specialist!contractors!designed!the!Macondo!well!as!an!exploration!well.!This!kind!
of!design!allows!for!later!completion!if!exploration!leads!to!sufficient!hydrocarbons,!
and!thus!oil,!being!found.!Taking!into!account!estimated!pore!pressures!and!
strength!of!the!area’s!geological!formations,!the!plan!included!everything!from!well!
equipment!and!operations!to!sealing!of!the!well!and!testing!of!the!seal’s!reliability!
(BP,!2010).!
BP!hired!offshore!drilling!contractor!Transocean!to!provide!the!rig!and!crew!
needed!for!drilling!operations,!and!specialized!contractors!on!board!Transocean’s!
semiQsubmersible!rig,!Marianas,!began!drilling!the!Macondo!well!on!October!6,!
2009.!Operations!continued!until!November!8,!2009,!when!a!hurricane!halted!
drilling!and!caused!sustained!damage!to!the!rig.!Marianas!went!off!contract,!and!BP!
submitted!an!Application(for(a(Revised(New(Well,!updating!the!Macondo!well!plan!to!
replace!Marianas!with!the!Deepwater(Horizon(rig.!This!application!was!approved!by!
MMS!on!January!14,!2010.!Also!owned!by!Transocean,!Deepwater(Horizon(had!been!
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under!contract!with!BP!in!the!Gulf!of!Mexico!for!nine!years.!In!this!time,!it!drilled!
approximately!30!wells,!twoQthirds!of!which!were!exploratory!wells.!The!rig!not!
only!had!experience!with!drilling!jobs!such!as!this!one,!but!it!was!considered!to!be!
one!of!the!best!performing!rigs!in!BP’s!fleet!in!terms!of!safety!and!drilling,!and!had!
not!had!a!single!“lostQtime!incident”!in!seven!years!of!drilling!(National!Commission,!
2011).!Deepwater(Horizon!had!passed!several!tests!and!inspections!since!it!entered!
Transocean’s!service,!including!“regular!inspections”!by!MMS.!According!to!
Transocean,!none!of!these!tests!ever!indicated!any!repairs!be!made!by!the!rig!crew!
(Transocean,!2011).!However,!a!September!2009!BP!safety!audit!produced!390!
items!and!3545!manQhours!of!work!needed!on!the!rig,!showing!that!it!was!behind!on!
many!maintenance!checks!and!tests,!some!of!which!were!high!priority!(National!
Commission,!2011).!
!

Drilling!recommenced!on!February!6,!2010.!The!crew!on!board!Deepwater(

Horizon!at!any!given!time!consisted!of!rotating!groups!of!workers!from!various!
companies,!including!Halliburton!cementers,!Sperry!Sun!mudloggers,!mud!
engineers!from!MQI!SWACO,!ROV!technicians!from!Oceaneering,!and!tank!cleaners!
and!technicians!from!OCS!Group!(National!Commission,!2011).!BP!crewmembers!on!
board!included!two!Well!Site!Leaders,!who!represented!BP’s!authority!on!the!rig;!a!
Well!Site!trainee;!and!three!subsea!personnel.!Transocean’s!team!consisted!of!drill,!
marine,!and!maintenance!crews,!with!the!Offshore!Installation!Manager!(OIM)!in!
charge!as!the!senior!Transocean!manager.!The!senior!toolpusher!led!the!Transocean!
drill!team,!with!two!toolpushers,!drillers,!and!assistant!drillers!below!him.!The!
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captain!of!the!rig!was!also!from!Transocean,!and!was!in!command!during!
emergency!operations!following!the!blowout!of!the!well!(Transocean,!2011).!
!
2.6(Investigations(Following(the(Deepwater(Horizon(Disaster(
After!the!Macondo!well’s!blowout!and!subsequent!rig!explosion!and!oil!spill!
on!April!20,!2010,!investigations!of!the!involved!regulatory!agencies!and!companies,!
as!well!as!relevant!decisions!made!by!them,!were!extensive!and!thorough.!Each!
report!on!the!disaster!highlighted!events!leading!to!the!blowout!differently,!
allowing!for!various!interpretations!of!where!fault!lay.!Only!by!a!methodical!
examination!of!a!range!of!the!reports!surrounding!the!incident,!with!an!eye!for!bias,!
can!the!story!of!what!really!happened!be!pieced!together.!
It!is!beyond!the!scope!of!this!thesis!to!analyze!every!extensive!investigation!
of!the!disaster.!Thus,!major!reports!from!conflicting!entities!were!selected!for!close!
examination.!As!the!operator!in!charge!of!the!Macondo!well!project,!BP’s!internal!
investigation,!“Deepwater(Horizon:!Accident!Investigation!Report”,!was!chosen.!It!is!
noted!that!a!team!within!BP!conducted!the!report,!giving!it!an!inherent!bias.!This!
bias!becomes!clear!through!aspects!of!the!report!such!as!its!specific!referral!to!the!
“BP!Macondo!well!team”!throughout,!rather!than!BP!as!a!whole!corporation!(BP,!
2010).!!
The!second!report!selected!was!that!of!Transocean,!a!company!contracted!by!
BP,!but!with!no!allegiance!to!them.!Transocean’s!internal!report!team!consisted!of!
experts!from!relevant!technical!fields!and!specialists!in!accident!investigation!
(Transocean,!2011).!!
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Finally,!a!major!government!report!on!the!incident!was!chosen,!as!it!was!a!
party!uninvolved!in!actual!drilling!operations.!President!Obama’s!National!
Commission!on!the!BP!Deepwater(Horizon!Oil!Spill!and!Offshore!Drilling!conducted!
this!investigation,!which!is!unique!from!the!other!two!reports!in!that!it!seeks!to!
build!drama!and!gain!sympathy!for!the!environmental!and!human!impacts!of!the!
spill!(National!Commission,!2011).!!
All!three!investigations!began!within!a!month!after!the!incident!and!had!their!
limitations.!Because!the!explosion!caused!so!much!destruction,!there!was!a!scarcity!
of!physical!evidence.!Additionally,!the!environmental!impact!from!the!spill!will!not!
be!fully!realized!for!years!to!come.!!
The!BP!report!(2010)!puts!the!burden!of!blame!for!the!explosion!on!a!“well!
integrity!failure”!that!allowed!hydrocarbons!to!escape!up!onto!the!rig,!as!well!as!
blowout!preventer!failure.!However,!BP!does!acknowledge!fault!in!some!decisions!
made!on!board!the!rig,!both!by!BP!and!Transocean!employees!(BP,!2010).!!
Transocean’s!report!(2011)!summarizes!the!incident!as!“a!result!of!a!
succession!of!interrelated!well!design,!construction,!and!temporary!abandonment!
decisions!that!compromised!the!integrity!of!the!well!and!compounded!the!risk!of!
failure”!(Transocean,!2011,!p.!10).!However,!it!ultimately!places!all!blame!on!BP,!
noting!that!the!company!had!certain!oversight!responsibilities!as!operator!of!the!
project:!surveying!the!geology!of!the!area,!designing!the!well!and!cement!
specifications!based!on!this,!obtaining!approval!from!MMS,!contracting!work!to!
various!experts,!overseeing!and!performing!quality!assurance!on!all!aspects!of!
drilling!operations,!and!approval!and!advisement!over!all!decisions!made!by!
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involved!parties.!The!report!states!that!“BP!failed!to!properly!assess,!manage,!and!
communicate!risk”!(Transocean,!2011,!p.!10),!and!was!operating!based!on!finishing!
the!drilling!during!a!narrowing!window!for!safe!operations.!Transocean!only!deems!
itself!responsible!for!providing!the!rig!and!drilling!crew,!monitoring!the!presence!of!
gas!in!drilling!mud,!and!adjusting!mud!properties!and!weight!as!needed.!
Supervision!of!cement!operations!was!attributed!to!Halliburton;!most!monitoring!
and!maintenance!of!logs!during!drilling!to!Sperry!Sun;!and!most!mud!testing!and!
recommendations!to!MQI!SWACO!(Transocean,!2011).((
The!National!Commission’s!report!(2011)!puts!blame!in!more!general!terms,!
citing!overall!failures!in!risk!management!and!safety!culture!by!BP,!Halliburton,!and!
Transocean.!In!addition,!the!report!notes!that!deepwater!drilling!is!a!relatively!new!
industry!without!sufficient!information!or!rules!in!place!to!help!avoid!risks!or!deal!
with!the!consequences!when!these!risks!are!realized.!With!a!move!to!deepwater!
drilling,!there!was!a!lag!in!updating!safety,!containment,!and!response!equipment,!as!
well!as!drilling!practices.!Some!blame!is!placed!on!the!federal!government!for!
making!policies!to!accelerate!offshore!exploration!and!development!faster!than!
technology!and!legislation!could!keep!up!(National!Commission,!2011).!It!is!worth!
noting!that!the!report!by!a!federal!agency!is!the!only!one!that!places!major!blame!on!
the!federal!government!for!the!disaster.!
!
2.7(Early(Problems(with(the(Macondo(Well(Project(
!

BP’s!report!(2010)!lists!two!events!that!occurred!in!the!months!leading!to!the!

blowout!of!the!Macondo!well!that!may!have!been!mishandled.!On!March!8th,!a!well!

!

20!

control!event!similar!to!the!actual!blowout!occurred.!Despite!successful!damage!
control,!the!team’s!response!time!was!deemed!too!slow.!There!is!no!evidence!that!
Transocean!took!any!documented,!corrective!actions!with!the!rig!crew!regarding!
this.!A!report!on!the!event!was!completed,!but!findings!were!not!listed!and!changes!
made!to!prevent!this!kind!of!event!from!happening!again!were!“still!under!review”!
at!the!time!of!the!April!20th!blowout!(BP,!2010).!
Drilling!of!the!final!section!of!the!well!began!on!April!2nd,!but!was!stopped!for!
a!few!days!due!to!a!lost!circulation!event.!The!well!was!drilled!to!its!final!depth!of!
18,360!feet!on!April!9th.!Five!days!were!spent!evaluating!the!well!and!ensuring!it!
was!in!good!condition.!It!was!verified!that!no!gas!was!entrained!in!the!mud,!and!no!
appreciable!volumes!of!gas!were!recorded,!indicating!stability.!However,!the!lost!
circulation!event!was!cause!for!extra!caution!and!reevaluation!of!plans!(BP,!2010).!
!
2.8(Unconventional(Plans(for(Temporary(Sealing(of(the(Well(
!

Once!it!was!determined!that!the!“pay!zone”!the!drilling!had!tapped!into!

would!be!profitable,!it!was!time!to!temporarily!abandon!the!well.!Completion!of!the!
project!would!be!handed!over!to!a!new!rig!after!the!removal!of!the!riser!and!
blowout!preventer!from!the!wellhead!(National!Commission,!2011).!
Due!to!the!lost!circulation!event!on!April!2nd,!the!production!casing!choice!
was!reevaluated.!The!original!recommendation!had!been!to!use!longQstring!casing,!
which!according!to!the!BP!(2010)!and!National!Commission!(2011)!reports!was!the!
less!risky!option.!BP!and!Halliburton!engineers!used!computer!programs!to!model!
potential!outcomes!of!the!cementing!process,!and!as!a!result!changed!their!
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recommendation!to!using!a!“liner”—an!allegedly!more!complex!and!leakQprone!
option!for!this!scenario.!Within!BP,!this!decision!was!not!well!received.!An!inQhouse!
BP!cementing!expert!reviewed!Halliburton’s!recommendations!and!changed!certain!
inputs!when!he!evaluated!potential!outcomes.!His!results!showed!the!longQstring!
casing!to!be!more!effective,!so!the!recommendation!was!switched!back!(National!
Commission,!2011).!
Transocean’s!investigation!(2011)!of!the!accident!highlights!this!as!one!of!
BP’s!poor!decisions!leading!to!the!blowout.!Blame!is!placed!mostly!on!BP,!but!also!
on!Halliburton!for!not!adequately!testing!the!cement!program.!The!report!lists!
alternative!technology!BP!could!have!used!instead,!as!well!as!a!deferred!installation!
of!the!casing!that!could!have!been!chosen!over!the!longQstring!production!casing.!
Transocean’s!is!the!only!report!that!claims!the!option!used!was!more!risky!
(Transocean,!2011).!
Another!deviation!from!the!original!well!abandonment!plan!involved!the!
number!of!centralizers!used.!Although!the!plan!had!called!for!sixteen!centralizers,!
Weatherford!only!had!six!in!stock!at!the!time.!An!alternative!was!to!use!“slipQon”!
centralizers,!but!the!BP!team!and!Wells!Team!Leader,!John!Guide,!distrusted!these!
on!the!basis!of!the!technical!difficulties!that!might!arise!from!them.!A!Halliburton!
engineer!ran!OptiCem!to!help!predict!the!outcome!of!the!cement!job!based!on!the!
variables.!The!results!from!this!indicated!that!the!Macondo!well!would!need!more!
than!the!six!available!centralizers.!The!BP!Drilling!Engineering!Team!Leader,!
Gregory!Walz,!obtained!permission!from!his!senior!manager!to!order!the!maximum!
amount!of!slipQons!possible!for!immediate!transport.!According!to!OptiCem!results,!
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this!new!total!of!21!centralizers!would!improve!the!cement!job!outcome.!Walz!then!
emailed!Guide!that!he!and!the!senior!manager!felt!they!needed!these!additional!
casings!in!order!to!honor!the!OptiCem!results.!He!additionally!stated!that!the!newly!
ordered!slipQons!would!be!of!special!design!and!only!one!piece.!However,!upon!their!
arrival,!a!BP!engineer!reported!the!casings!were!actually!of!conventional!multiQpiece!
design.!Guide!responded!to!Walz’s!email,!arguing!that!the!slipQons!were!not!
specially!designed!and!that!it!would!take!ten!hours!to!install!them.!Additionally,!a!
BP!drilling!engineer!agreed!that!they!probably!didn’t!need!the!extra!slipQons,!and!
ultimately!only!six!centralizers!were!used!(National!Commission,!2011).!This!
convoluted!decisionQmaking!process!and!lack!of!attention!to!expertise!was!
characteristic!throughout!the!drilling!of!the!Macondo!well.!
MMS!approved!of!temporary!well!abandonment,!including!the!lastQminute!
changes,!on!April!16th!(BP,!2010),!although!this!was!not!the!final!version!of!the!plan!
that!was!actually!used.!The!plan!began!with!placement!of!production!casing,!which!
would!be!challenging!because!of!lost!mud!circulation!problems!and!the!delicate!rock!
formation!at!the!bottom!of!the!well.!Next,!it!listed!that!Halliburton!would!pump!a!
specialized!cement!blend!down!the!casing!string!and!then!up!into!the!annular!space!
to!seal!the!well!off.!This!would!not!be!successful!unless!it!isolated!the!hydrocarbonQ
bearing!zone!from!the!annular!space.!BP’s!plan!also!included!placement!of!the!
cement!plug!3300!feet!below!the!ocean!floor,!which!was!both!unusual!and!deeper!
than!MMS!regulations!allow!without!analysis!and!subsequent!exemption!(National!
Commission,!2011).!!
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A!main!cause!leading!up!to!the!blowout!that!was!listed!by!the!National!
Commission!(2011)!and!Transocean!(2011)!reports,!but!not!BP’s!(2010),!was!this!
temporary!abandonment!procedure.!Because!of!BP’s!unnecessary!decision!to!
replace!mud!with!seawater!3300!feet!below!the!mud!line,!the!National!
Commission’s!report!(2011)!states!that!more!stress!was!placed!on!the!cement!job!at!
the!bottom!of!the!well.!Additionally,!the!decision!to!displace!mud!from!the!riser!
before!setting!a!surface!cement!plug!or!other!barrier!in!the!production!casing!would!
make!the!cement!barrier!the!only!barrier!between!the!oil!and!the!rig!(National!
Commission,!2011).!Transocean’s!report!(2011)!states!that!BP!had!an!overall!lack!of!
risk!assessment!and!safety!procedures,!including!those!involving!lastQminute!
adjustments!to!a!continuously!altered!temporary!abandonment!plan,!which!was!
never!approved!by!MMS!in!its!final!form.!The!report!claims!that!the!biggest!flaw!in!
the!plan!was!the!displacement!of!large!amounts!of!drilling!mud,!which!it!deems!was!
unnecessary.!MQI!SWACO!gets!little!blame!for!developing!the!displacement!
procedure,!since!it!is!BP!that!ultimately!approved!it!(Transocean,!2011).!
!
2.9(Failure(of(Cement(Job(to(Seal(the(Macondo(Well(
Once!temporary!abandonment!procedures!were!approved,!preparations!for!
the!cement!job!began:!the!float!collar!would!need!to!be!converted!so!that!fluids!
could!no!longer!come!back!up!the!casing.!To!convert!the!valves,!mud!was!pumped!
down!through!the!casing.!Although!the!team!pumped!fluids!up!to!a!high!pressure,!
flow!was!not!established.!The!BP!Well!Site!Leader,!Robert!Kaluza,!and!an!engineer!
contacted!BP’s!John!Guide!and!decided!to!increase!pressure.!MQI!SWACO!had!
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predicted!that!6!BPM!would!be!required!to!circulate!the!mud,!but!although!the!
pump!rate!never!exceeded!4!BPM,!mud!did!begin!to!flow.!BP’s!team!concluded!that!
the!pressure!gauge!was!broken!and!the!float!collar!had!converted!(National!
Commission,!2011).!Transocean’s!report!highlights!this!as!another!of!BP’s!poor!
decisions,!as!it!reflected!another!deviation!from!the!original!plan.!The!report!states!
BP!may!have!acted!this!way!due!to!time!constraints,!despite!the!anomalies!
(Transocean,!2011).!
With!the!float!collar!deemed!successfully!converted,!it!was!time!to!begin!the!
cement!job.!Cement!would!be!pumped!down,!followed!by!mud!to!push!the!cement!
up!through!the!annular!space!for!a!long!and!continuous!seal!of!the!well.!This!is!a!
difficult!task!involving!a!reliance!on!indirect!measures!such!as!pressure!and!volume!
to!gauge!progress!deep!down!in!the!well.!BP!was!very!concerned!with!“losing!
returns”!by!fracturing!the!formation!at!the!bottom!of!the!well,!which!would!result!in!
critical!cement!flowing!out!and!being!lost,!and!leave!the!annular!space!open!to!
hydrocarbon!flow.!Concerns!such!as!these!put!constraints!on!Halliburton’s!
cementing!design,!including!limiting!circulation!of!drilling!mud!through!the!
wellbore!before!cementing,!rather!than!“bottoms!upping”!the!cement.!Additionally,!
the!cement!would!be!pumped!down!at!a!low!rate,!even!though!faster!rates!usually!
result!in!more!efficiency.!As!a!safeguard!against!errors,!extra!cement!is!often!used.!
However,!in!this!case!the!volume!of!cement!to!be!pumped!down!was!limited,!leaving!
little!margin!for!error.!Nitrogen!foam!cement!would!be!used!to!lighten!the!cement!
slurry,!reducing!the!pressure!the!cement!would!exert!on!the!delicate!rock!formation!
(National!Commission,!2011).!!
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Halliburton!had!begun!designing!the!cement!job!months!earlier.!Prior!to!use,!
it!was!required!that!the!cement!slurry!be!tested.!The!earliest!cement!testing!by!
Halliburton!showed!severe!failings,!and!these!results!were!never!reported!to!BP.!!In!
March,!BP!received!lab!test!results!from!Halliburton!indicating!that!the!design!was!
still!unstable!under!different!conditions.!The!Halliburton!engineer!on!board!that!
commissioned!the!test!did!not!comment!on!the!instability!and!there!is!no!evidence!
that!BP!examined!the!data!at!all.!In!midQApril,!more!specific!well!condition!
information!became!available,!so!Halliburton!conducted!more!tests.!The!first!test!
indicated!instability,!but!was!not!reported!to!BP.!For!a!followQup!test,!Halliburton!
altered!the!conditions!slightly,!and!finally!got!results!indicating!stability.!However,!
due!to!the!time!frame,!it!is!unclear!if!the!Halliburton!cement!team!on!board!
Deepwater(Horizon!saw!these!positive!results!before!pumping!the!cement!job,!and!
BP!did!not!receive!the!results!until!almost!a!week!after!the!blowout.!Additionally,!
there!is!no!evidence!of!either!party!requesting!the!results!(National!Commission,!
2011).!The!BP!internal!investigation!(2010)!concedes!the!point!that!although!
Halliburton!did!not!conduct!all!of!the!relevant!tests!before!final!cement!placement,!
the!BP!Macondo!well!team!was!also!at!fault!for!failing!to!ensure!they!did!so!(BP,!
2010).!Both!parties!lacked!the!incentive!to!confirm!safety!precautions!were!taken.!
!

After!the!primary!cement!job!was!pumped,!a!BP!representative!and!

Halliburton’s!Service!Supervisor!performed!an!evaluation!and!determined!that!the!
float!collar!was!closed!and!holding.!5.5!barrels!of!flowQback!were!observed,!although!
it!had!been!predicted!that!5!barrels!of!flowQback!would!indicate!success.!Despite!a!
2007!MMS!study!noting!that!cementing!problems!were!one!of!the!most!significant!
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factors!involved!in!recent!well!blowouts,!a!BP!engineer!decided!that!this!was!within!
an!acceptable!margin!of!error.!There!were!no!lost!returns,!so!according!to!the!
original!abandonment!criteria,!the!job!was!considered!a!success.!Both!BP!and!
Halliburton!agreed!they!had!done!a!great!job.!BP’s!abandonment!plans!stipulated!
that!if!there!were!no!losses!while!cementing!the!longQstring,!a!cement!evaluation!
test!by!technicians!from!Schlumberger!would!not!be!necessary.!Thus,!the!
technicians!were!sent!home,!saving!BP!both!time!and!$128,000!(National!
Commission,!2011).!!
All!three!reports!cite!the!failure!of!the!cement!job!as!a!major!cause!of!the!
well’s!eventual!blowout.!Specifically,!both!the!annulus!cement!barrier!and!cement!in!
the!shoe!track!and!float!collar!failed!to!isolate!hydrocarbons!from!entering!the!well.!
BP’s!report!(2010)!places!blame!on!BP!and!Halliburton.!The!BP!Macondo!well!team!
did!not!fully!conform!to!BP’s!Engineering!Technical!Practice!when!they!failed!to!
conduct!a!formal!risk!assessment!of!the!annulus!cement!barriers!and!provide!
effective!quality!assurance!on!Halliburton’s!technical!services.!The!well!team!also!
did!not!give!BP!zonal!isolation!experts!the!opportunity!to!perform!effective!quality!
assurance!of!the!cement!design,!although!the!report!makes!no!mention!of!BP!
management!demanding!this!opportunity!be!provided.!The!report!states!that!
Halliburton!probably!did!not!supervise!the!inQhouse!cement!job.!Additionally,!in!the!
investigation!of!the!blowout,!a!third!party!tried!to!replicate!the!cement!design,!and!
results!from!testing!of!this!indicated!the!cement!used!was!most!likely!unstable!(BP,!
2010).!
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Transocean’s!report!(2011)!places!blame!for!the!failed!cement!job!on!
mismanagement!within!BP,!rather!than!on!Halliburton’s!cement!design.!The!report!
states!BP!was!at!fault!for!requesting!a!complex!cement!design;!not!conducting!
critical!tests!despite!the!risky!conditions;!and!failure!to!use!“bottoms!up”!circulation!
or!test!the!cement!job!after!it!was!completed.!Additionally,!it!states!that!it!was!BP’s!
responsibility!to!fully!communicate!information!about!the!testing!(or!lackQthereof)!
of!the!cement!and!other!barriers!in!the!well!to!the!crew.!Because!they!did!not!do!
this,!all!of!the!drill!crew!actions!were!performed!under!the!assumption!that!there!
was!nothing!wrong!with!the!well!or!cement!job—a!point!mentioned!repeatedly!
throughout!the!report.!There!is!a!brief!reference!to!Halliburton’s!failure!to!properly!
test!the!cement!design,!but!blame!is!focused!on!BP.!This!is!unique!from!the!other!
two!reports,!which!repeatedly!mention!Halliburton’s!fault!in!the!cement!design,!
testing,!and!communication!with!BP,!and!in!beginning!the!job!before!positive!results!
on!the!cement!design!were!obtained.!Finally,!Transocean!states!their!employees!had!
no!role!in!any!part!of!the!cement!design!or!installation!(Transocean,!2011).!
!

The!National!Commission’s!report!(2011)!offers!specifics!of!the!failure!of!the!

cement!job!that!the!other!reports!do!not.!For!example,!the!team’s!decision!to!use!a!
longQstring!casing!instead!of!a!liner!should!have!inspired!more!caution!in!BP!and!
Halliburton,!and!the!process!of!choosing!the!number!of!centralizers!to!use!
highlighted!the!poor!communication!between!BP!and!Halliburton.!Additionally,!BP!
failed!to!consider!what!anomalous!pressure!readings!may!have!indicated!in!relation!
to!float!valve!conversion!and!circulating!pressure.!Lost!returns!should!not!have!
been!the!only!indication!that!the!cement!job!needed!to!be!tested,!so!that!the!
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Schlumberger!team!would!not!have!been!sent!away.!There!was!further!lack!of!
communication!regarding!cement!testing!when!Halliburton!did!not!report!the!
results!to!BP,!and!in!turn,!BP!did!not!request!the!results.!Finally,!BP!did!not!exercise!
special!caution!before!relying!on!the!primary!cement!barrier!(National!Commission,!
2011).!
!
2.10(Failed(Temporary(Abandonment(of(the(Macondo(Well(
The!cement!job!had!been!completed!during!the!early!morning!hours!of!April!
20,!2010,!the!day!of!the!well’s!blowout.!There!were!a!few!anomalies!in!the!crew!on!
board!that!day.!The!BP!Well!Site!Leader!had!flown!back!to!shore!four!days!earlier!
for!a!required!wellQcontrol!class,!so!Robert!Kaluza!was!temporarily!on!board!to!fill!
in!for!him.!Additionally,!“VIPs”!from!Transocean!and!BP!were!on!board!for!a!tour!
and!update!on!the!proceedings,!and!had!been!giving!the!crew!high!praises!for!their!
work!(National!Commission,!2011).!!
With!the!casings,!centralizers,!and!cement!job!in!place,!a!BP!engineer!sent!the!
temporary!abandonment!procedures!to!on!board!officials!at!10:43AM!on!April!
20th—the!first!time!the!BP!Well!Site!Leaders!saw!the!final!procedures!(Transocean,!
2011).!There!was!“no!evidence!that!these!changes!went!through!any(sort!of!formal!
risk!assessment!or!management!of!change!process”!(National!Commission,!2011,!p.!
120),!despite!the!fact!that!MMS!regulations!require!approval!of!temporary!
abandonment!procedure!plans!at!least!48!hours!before!the!process!begins!
(Transocean,!2011).!!The!Application(for(Permission(to(Modify!the!temporary!
abandonment!plan!that!had!been!approved!by!MMS!was!different!than!the!final!plan!
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sent!out,!as!well!as!previous!versions!of!the!plan!that!had!been!proposed.!The!rig!
crew!did!not!see!the!final!temporary!abandonment!plan!until!their!11:00AM!
meeting.!The!procedure!called!for!a!positive!pressure!test,!running!the!drill!pipe!into!
the!well!3300!feet!below!the!ocean!floor,!displacement!of!3300!feel!of!mud!with!
seawater,!a!negative!pressure!test,!setting!of!a!cement!plug!3300!feet!below!the!
ocean!floor,!and!setting!the!lockdown!sleeve.!Some!of!these!steps!would!never!be!
completed!(National!Commission,!2011).!
First,!the!crew!performed!a!positive!pressure!test!to!ensure!the!integrity!of!
the!production!casing.!This!step!was!required!by!MMS.!They!ran!the!test!twice,!and!
pressure!remained!steady!each!time,!indicating!there!were!no!leaks!from!inside!the!
well.!The!drilling!crew,!BP’s!Kaluza,!and!a!visiting!BP!executive!deemed!the!test!a!
success!(National!Commission,!2011).!!
The!next!step!was!a!negative!pressure!test!to!evaluate!the!integrity!of!the!
casing!and!the!bottomhole!cement!job,!as!well!as!to!ensure!that!outside!fluids!were!
not!leaking!into!the!well.!This!was!the!only!test!included!in!the!plan!that!would!have!
detected!if!fluids!like!hydrocarbons!could!leak!in!through!the!bottom!of!the!well.!For!
the!test!to!be!successful,!there!should!have!been!no!flow!out!of!the!well!or!pressure!
build!up!inside!the!well!for!a!sustained!period.!It!was!critical!that!the!well!be!able!to!
withstand!the!underbalance!of!pressure!that!would!occur!after!temporary!
abandonment!was!completed.!If!the!test!failed!and!hydrocarbons!could!leak!in,!
diagnosing!and!fixing!the!problem!could!take!days.!For!a!key!part!of!the!procedure,!
BP!chose!unusual!spacer!fluids!to!separate!the!oilQbased!drilling!mud!from!seawater.!
MQI!SWACO!made!a!large!quantity!of!this!spacer!out!of!two!different!lostQcirculation!
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materials!left!over!on!the!rig.!In!accordance!with!the!Resource!and!Conservation!
Recovery!Act,!BP!would!have!needed!to!dispose!of!these!materials!as!hazardous!
waste!onshore!had!they!not!made!the!decision!to!use!them!in!this!way.!The!unique!
spacer!created!was!never!thoroughly!tested!for!its!purpose!(National!Commission,!
2011),!and!it!may!have!been!selected!as!a!timeQ!and!moneyQsaving!shortcut!for!BP.!
The!negative!pressure!test!was!first!performed!on!the!drill!pipe,!which!
required!opening!it!and!bleeding!its!pressure!to!zero!to!watch!for!flow.!When!the!
crew!did!this,!they!could!not!get!the!pressure!down!to!zero,!and!upon!closing!it!
again,!the!pressure!jumped!right!back!up.!At!this!point,!both!toolpushers!and!both!
Well!Site!Leaders!were!present,!as!well!as!the!BP!and!Transocean!executives!leading!
the!rig!tour.!The!test!results!indicated!that!fluid!spacer!was!leaking!down!past!the!
annular!preventer,!so!the!Transocean!Offshore!Installation!Manager!ordered!it!be!
more!tightly!closed.!!When!they!opened!the!drill!pipe!for!a!second!try,!the!pressure!
did!go!down!to!zero,!but!as!soon!as!it!was!closed,!the!pressure!again!jumped!back!
up.!After!repeating!this!a!third!time,!the!pressure!jumped!up!even!higher—
something!was!amiss!(National!Commission,!2011).!
BP!and!Transocean!team!members!discussed!the!readings.!A!very!
experienced!toolpusher,!who!was!moving!on!to!teach!in!Transocean’s!well!control!
school!the!following!day,!was!involved!in!the!test!(National!Commission,!2011).!He!
explained!the!irregular!pressure!readings!as!an!anomaly!called!the!“bladder!effect”,!
which!he!and!a!driller!stated!they!had!seen!before.!The!rig!crew!and!BP!Well!Site!
Leader!found!the!explanation!plausible!without!much!question,!and!deemed!the!test!
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successful.!However,!there!is!no!evidence!that!a!“bladder!effect”!has!ever!occurred,!
or!is!even!possible!(BP,!2010).!!
According!to!BP’s!report!(2010),!the!team!began!the!test!on!the!drill!pipe!
because!this!was!the!crew’s!“preferred!method”.!However,!around!5:30PM,!the!test!
was!moved!over!to!the!kill!line.!Both!the!BP!(2010)!and!National!Commission!
(2011)!reports!explain!that!in!the!original!application!approved!by!MMS,!this!was!
the!designated!site!for!the!negative!pressure!test.!BP’s!Well!Site!Leader!made!the!
decision!to!move!it!in!order!to!correct!the!crew’s!mistake!(BP,!2010).!However,!
Transocean’s!report!(2011)!states!that!moving!the!test!to!the!kill!line!was!a!mistake!
that!led!directly!to!results!being!misinterpreted,!and!blame!is!placed!on!BP!for!
making!this!decision.!According!to!this!report,!a!successful!negative!pressure!test!on!
the!kill!line!could!never!have!been!achieved!due!to!flaws!in!the!displacement!plan,!
including!the!unique!spacer!used!and!its!presence!below!the!closed!annular!
preventer.!This!reasoning!removes!blame!from!the!Transocean!drill!crew,!who!had!
been!performing!the!test!on!the!drill!pipe!(Transocean,!2011).!The!kill!line!test!
should!have!indicated!the!same!pressure!as!the!test!on!the!drill!pipe,!but!although!
the!kill!line!test!was!deemed!successful,!pressure!remained!on!the!drill!pipe.!There!
is!no!evidence!that!the!Well!Site!Leaders!or!crew!ever!explained!these!two!different!
pressure!readings,!and!“based!on!the!available!information,!the!1400!psi!reading!on!
the!drill!pipe!could!only!have!been!caused!by!a!leak!into!the!well”!(National!
Commission,!2011,!p.!124Q5).!
In!addition!to!this!inconclusive!explanation,!BP’s!report!(2011)!places!some!
blame!on!management!for!the!incorrect!interpretation!of!the!negative!pressure!test.!
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MMS!regulations!lacked!specific!minimum!procedures!and!success/failure!criteria!
for!negative!pressure!tests,!and!neither!BP!nor!Transocean!provided!any!guidelines!
either.!Thus,!crewmembers!were!left!to!make!the!decision!of!what!a!“successful”!test!
meant!at!their!own!discretion.!Because!of!this,!BP!and!Transocean!rig!leaders!should!
have!been!more!careful!during!the!test.!The!Transocean!Well!Control!Handbook!
stated!that!the!rig!crew!should!have!consulted!the!Transocean!‘manager’!with!the!
results!of!the!test,!although!who!exactly!this!is!was!not!stated.!The!crew!did!not!
follow!this!protocol!(BP,!2010).!!
Transocean’s!report!(2011)!also!states!misinterpretation!of!the!negative!
pressure!test!results!as!a!major!cause!of!the!blowout,!blaming!MMS!and!the!industry!
for!a!lack!of!established!standards!for!the!test,!and!BP!as!the!operator!for!deeming!
the!test!successful!(Transocean,!2011).!!
The!National!Commission’s!report!(2011)!lists!the!negative!pressure!test!as!a!
major!problem!as!well,!and!points!out!that!the!test!should!not!have!been!the!only!
measure!of!cement!integrity!relied!upon.!Despite!the!fact!that!pressure!data!had!
continued!to!indicate!that!fluids!were!entering!the!well,!crewmembers!only!looked!
for!explanations,!rather!than!accepting!what!the!test!was!indicating:!the!cement!had!
failed!to!seal!the!well.!Like!the!other!reports,!the!National!Commission’s!report!
(2011)!mentions!the!lack!of!standard!procedures!for!the!test!and!its!interpretation.!
MMS!is!blamed!for!this,!as!well!as!BP!and!Transocean!for!their!lack!of!specific!
protocol!or!trained!personnel.!Additionally,!BP!had!no!regulations!for!reporting!
back!to!shore!with!anomalous!data!(National!Commission,!2011).!
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After!the!negative!pressure!test!was!completed,!it!was!time!for!displacement!
of!3300!feet!of!mud!with!seawater.!During!displacement,!there!is!greater!risk!for!a!
kick,!and!drillers!from!Transocean!and!mudloggers!from!Sperry!Sun!were!the!
crewmembers!responsible!for!detecting!one.!These!crewmembers!were!supposed!to!
monitor!data!that!included!the!volume!of!mud!in!active!pits,!an!increase!of!which!
would!mean!something!was!flowing!into!the!well.!Flow!into!and!out!of!the!well!was!
also!to!be!monitored—when!flow!out!is!greater,!this!indicates!a!kick.!Visual!“flow!
checks”!were!one!way!the!crewmembers!could!have!monitored!this,!as!well!as!
ensured!flow!out!of!the!well!stopped!when!the!pumps!were!shut!off.!The!driller!and!
mudlogger!were!specifically!in!charge!of!monitoring!the!drill!pipe!pressure,!which!is!
a!more!ambiguous!indicator!of!a!kick!(National!Commission,!2011).!The!Transocean!
Well!Control!Handbook!stipulated!that!the!well!should!be!monitored!at!all!times,!but!
did!not!explain!how!this!should!be!done!in!special!circumstances,!like!during!inQflow!
testing!or!cleanup.!Drillers,!indicated!by!Transocean’s!policies!as!responsible!for!
monitoring!a!well’s!flow!conditions!and!shutting!off!the!well!at!an!indication!of!flow,!
should!have!had!multiple!ways!to!monitor!flow!under!any!circumstances.!Although!
instructions!for!the!closing!of!a!well!with!a!small!influx!of!fluids!were!given,!there!
was!no!mention!of!what!to!do!in!an!emergency!situation!such!as!loss!of!well!control.!
Protocol!additionally!did!not!include!how!to!handle!continuous!flow!(BP,!2010).!
Around!8:00PM,!the!displacement!of!3300!feet!of!mud!with!seawater!began.!
Displaced!mud!was!rerouted!between!pits!to!accommodate!the!constantly!incoming!
volume.!During!displacement,!a!Sperry!Sun!mudlogger!told!a!Transocean!assistant!
driller!that!pit!levels!could!not!be!monitored!during!offloading!of!the!mud!onto!
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Deepwater(Horizon’s(supply!vessel,!Damon(Bankston.!The!assistant!driller!
responded!that!the!mudlogger!would!be!notified!when!the!offloading!stopped,!but!
during!this!time!no!reliable!flow!data!was!recorded.!Additionally,!when!offloading!
did!end!a!couple!hours!later,!the!assistant!driller!did!not!notify!the!mudlogger!(BP,!
2010),!highlighting!the!lack!of!communication!between!involved!companies.!The!
drill!pipe!pressure!had!been!decreasing!as!it!was!supposed!to!until!9:00PM,!when!
pressure!began!to!slowly!increase.!There!was!a!lot!going!on,!and!no!one!noticed!this.!
Because!mud!was!being!sent!from!many!locations!into!the!active!pit!system!at!this!
time,!the!National!Commission’s!report!(2011)!indicates!it!may!have!been!difficult!
to!adequately!monitor!active!pit!volume!(National!Commission,!2011).!
The!crew!needed!to!dump!spacer!fluid!returned!to!the!surface!overboard,!but!
first!had!to!conduct!a!“sheen!test”!to!make!sure!all!the!oilQbased!mud!had!been!
removed!from!the!riser.!At!9:08PM,!they!shut!down!the!pumps!to!perform!the!test,!
and!the!BP!Well!Site!Leader!deemed!there!was!no!oily!sheen!in!the!sample!(National!
Commission,!2011).!!Transocean’s!report!(2011)!states!that!spacer!had!not!yet!
reached!the!surface!at!the!time!of!the!test,!which!is!the!only!reason!it!was!
interpreted!as!successful!(Transocean,!2011).!A!mudlogger!performed!a!visual!flow!
check!to!ensure!the!well!was!not!flowing!while!the!pumps!were!off.!Although!no!one!
noticed!at!the!time,!Sperry!Sun!monitoring!data!was!clearly!indicating!that!the!drill!
pipe!pressure!had!continued!to!increase,!rather!than!stay!constant!or!decrease,!as!it!
should!have.!Four!minutes!after!the!pumps!were!turned!back!on,!a!pressureQrelief!
valve!on!one!of!the!pumps!blew,!and!a!team!of!the!chief!electrician,!assistant!driller,!
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and!three!other!personnel!was!sent!to!fix!it.!They!were!still!doing!this!when!the!
explosion!occurred!(National!Commission,!2011).!
Around!9:18PM,!the!pressure!of!one!of!the!pumps!discharging!displaced!well!
fluids!and!mud!overboard!spiked,!and!all!three!pumps!were!shut!down!(BP,!2010).!
The!shut!down!meant!the!cement!plug!placement!would!be!delayed!(National!
Commission,!2011).!The!toolpusher!reported!to!the!senior!toolpusher!that!
displacement!was!“going!fine”,!so!the!pumps!were!restarted!for!a!little,!only!to!be!
shut!down!again!as!drill!pipe!pressure!continued!to!rise!and!remain!higher!than!kill!
line!pressure!(BP,!2010).!At!9:36PM,!Transocean’s!onQduty!driller,!Dewey!Revette,!
ordered!a!crewmember!to!bleed!off!the!drill!pipe!pressure!to!eliminate!the!
difference,!which!worked!for!a!second!before!pressure!started!to!go!up!again.!
Despite!this!evidence!of!a!kick!building,!no!crewmember!performed!a!visual!flow!
check!or!took!actions!to!shut!in!the!well.!At!9:39PM,!drill!pipe!pressure!finally!
started!to!decrease.!The!National!Commission’s!report!(2011)!states!that!in!
retrospect,!this!indicated!that!hydrocarbons!were!beginning!to!push!heavy!drilling!
mud!out!of!the!way!past!the!drill!pipe!(National!Commission,!2011).!!
Revette!first!realized!a!kick!had!occurred!around!9:40PM!when!drilling!mud!
began!spewing!on!to!the!rig’s!deck.!The!toolpusher!and!assistant!driller!immediately!
routed!mudflow!from!the!riser!through!the!diverter!system,!sending!it!to!the!mud!
gas!separator!rather!than!overboard!(National!Commission,!2011).!The!Transocean!
Well!Control!Handbook!states!that!flow!should!be!diverted!to!the!mud!gas!separator!
during!certain!well!control!situations,!but!in!the!case!of!gas!expansion!in!the!riser,!it!
is!indicated!that!flow!should!be!diverted!overboard!(BP,!2010).!The!National!
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Commission’s!report!(2011)!indicates!that!if!this!had!been!done,!the!crew!would!
have!saved!precious!time!and!chances!for!ignition!would!have!been!reduced!
(National!Commission,!2011),!providing!another!example!of!the!problems!caused!by!
a!lack!of!attention!to!safety!protocol.!!
At!9:45PM,!the!assistant!driller!called!the!senior!toolpusher!to!report!that!the!
well!was!blowing!out!and!they!were!shutting!in!the!well!by!closing!the!annular!
preventer.!This!is!about!the!same!time!that!Damon(Bankston!was!warned!to!stay!
back!because!of!well!problems!(BP,!2010).!Unfortunately,!it!was!too!late.!Gas!was!
already!above!the!blowout!preventer!when!shutQin!began,!and!the!mud!gas!
separator!was!completely!overwhelmed!by!flow!from!the!well.!The!first!explosion!
occurred!at!9:49PM,!and!was!followed!quickly!by!a!second!(National!Commission,!
2011).!!
In!all!three!reports,!the!delayed!action!of!the!rig!crew!is!listed!as!a!major!
mistake!that!led!to!the!failure!of!the!annular!preventer!to!fully!seal!the!well.!Sperry!
Sun!data!indicating!a!kick!and!warranting!closer!examination!was!available!much!
earlier!than!detection!occurred.!Although!Transocean’s!handbook!calls!for!well!
monitoring!at!all!times,!it!does!not!specify!how!to!do!so!in!special!circumstances,!
which!BP’s!report!(2010)!lists!as!a!mistake!of!Transocean’s!(BP,!2010).!Transocean’s!
report!(2011)!states!that!once!the!influx!was!detected,!the!crew!acted!properly!and!
according!to!their!training,!and!that!the!explosion!was!inevitable!(Transocean,!
2011).!The!National!Commission’s!report!(2011)!concludes!that!there!should!be!
automated!alarms!put!into!monitoring!systems!on!board!drilling!rigs!that!can!detect!
anomalies!requiring!attention!from!the!crew!(National!Commission,!2011).!!
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BP’s!report!(2010)!was!unique!in!placing!blame!for!the!failure!of!some!of!the!
systems!on!board!Deepwater(Horizon!for!the!blowout,!indicating!Transocean!
maintenance!was!at!fault.!For!example,!the!National!Commission’s!report!(2011)!
states!that!the!problem!was!the!decision!to!rout!flow!to!the!mud!gas!separator!
(National!Commission,!2011),!whereas!BP’s!report!(2010)!states!it!was!the!design!of!
the!mud!gas!separator!that!was!flawed,!since!it!was!overwhelmed!by!the!influx.!
Additionally,!the!design!of!the!heating,!ventilating,!and!air!conditioning!(HVAC)!
system!allowed!for!a!gas!rich!mixture!to!enter!the!engine!rooms,!creating!a!potential!
ignition!source.!The!report!states!that!the!system!should!have!had!an!automated!
function!to!help!prevent!fire!and!gas!from!entering!vulnerable!locations,!and!that!
the!engine!room!HVAC!system!should!have!been!designed!to!block!gas!automatically!
(BP,!2010).!Transocean’s!report!(2011)!states!that!the!fire!and!gas!detection!system,!
which!was!integrated!with!the!HVAC!system,!was!designed!and!maintained!
according!to!regulations,!and!functioned!as!it!should!have!on!the!night!of!the!
blowout.!Furthermore,!it!states!that!the!HVAC!system!actually!served!to!help!ensure!
safety!of!personnel!on!board!(Transocean,!2011).!
!
2.11(Failure(of(Emergency(Procedures(Following(the(Blowout(
Following!the!blowout,!multiple!emergency!mechanisms!failed!to!seal!the!
well!and!subsequently,!prevent!the!explosions.!According!to!both!BP’s!(2010)!and!
the!National!Commission’s!(2011)!reports,!the!blowout!preventer!was!one!of!the!
main!mechanisms!that!failed.!Although!the!recommended!time!for!recertification!
was!five!years,!parts!of!the!blowout!preventer!had!not!been!recertified!in!nine!years.!
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Additionally,!its!maintenance!was!not!properly!recorded,!which!Transocean!was!
blamed!for!(National!Commission,!2011).!BP’s!report!(2010)!concedes!blame!in!that!
there!were!potential!weaknesses!in!testing!methods!and!the!maintenance!
management!system!for!the!blowout!preventer,!as!well!as!the!fact!that!the!crew!was!
not!adequately!prepared!to!use!it.!It!places!blame!on!Transocean!for!not!fully!
addressing!what!to!do!in!highQflow!emergency!situations!after!well!control!is!lost!
(BP,!2010).!!
Unlike!the!other!investigations,!Transocean’s!(2011)!states!that!“forensic!
evidence!from!independent!postQincident!testing!by!Det!Norske!Veritas!(DNV)!and!
evaluation!by!the!Transocean!investigation!team!confirm!that!the!Deepwater(
Horizon([blowout!preventer]!was!properly!maintained!and!did!operate!as!designed”!
(Transocean,!2011,!p.!11).!However,!the!report!does!cite!that!there!were!some!
minor!leaks!in!the!blowout!preventer,!found!both!before!and!after!the!accident,!
although!it!claims!these!had!no!effects!on!functionality!(Transocean,!2011).!This!is!
the!only!report!to!dedicate!an!entire!section!to!the!blowout!preventer!and!its!design,!
purpose,!and!functionality,!probably!because!it!was!the!property!and!responsibility!
of!Transocean.!
After!the!kick!was!detected,!the!annular!preventer!inside!the!blowout!
preventer!was!activated,!followed!by!the!variable!bore!ram,!but!flow!rates!at!this!
point!were!probably!too!high!for!these!mechanisms!to!effectively!seal!the!well(
(National!Commission,!2011).!This!is!in!direct!contrast!with!Transocean’s!report!
(2011),!which!states!that!the!blowout!preventer!was!fully!operational!and!
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functioned!properly.!The!report!cites!the!influx!of!hydrocarbons!for!the!failure!to!
fully!seal!the!well,!rather!than!the!blowout!preventer!itself!(Transocean,!2011).!
The!blowout!preventer’s!“deadman!system”,!which!had!been!installed!to!
automatically!trigger!the!blind!shear!ram!in!the!case!of!lost!power!and!
communication!also!failed.!Failure!of!this!system!was!attributed!to!poor!
maintenance,!rather!than!damage!from!the!explosion.!BP’s!(2010)!and!the!National!
Commission’s!(2011)!reports!both!state!that!two!control!pods!critical!to!the!system!
were!faulty:!one’s!battery!was!almost!dead!and!another!had!defective!solenoid!
valves.!It!was!reported!that!Transocean!did!not!change!the!batteries!on!the!control!
pods!as!often!as!was!required.!Additionally,!the!National!Commission’s!report!
(2011)!states!there!had!been!no!surface!testing!of!the!deadman!system,!which!
would!have!led!to!discovery!of!blowout!preventer!hydraulic!leaks!(National!
Commission,!2011).!!
Transocean’s!report!is!the!only!one!that!states!the!control!pods!on!the!
blowout!preventer!were!“fully!functional!at!the!time!of!the!incident”!(Transocean,!
2011,!p.!158),!despite!conceding!problems!with!the!battery!and!solenoid!valve.!
Thus,!the!report!claims!full!functionality!despite!these!issues.!As!blowout!preventer!
maintenance!was!mostly!Transocean’s!responsibility,!it!is!clear!why!they!argue!they!
were!not!to!blame!for!its!shortcomings.!While!the!other!reports!indicate!that!it!was!
the!explosions!that!prevented!the!deadman!system!from!engaging,!Transocean!
reports!that!the!system!did!engage,!however!the!blind!shear!rams!it!activated!did!
not!fully!seal!the!well!(Transocean,!2011).!These!types!of!discrepancies!between!the!
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reports!are!evidence!of!the!shifting!of!blame!that!has!been!consistently!occurring!
since!the!disaster!due!to!a!lack!of!clear!accountability!set!forth!in!the!industry.!!
The!emergency!disconnect!system!(EDS)!was!another!backup!mechanism!
that!should!have!closed!the!blind!shear!ram,!severed!the!drill!pipe,!sealed!the!well,!
and!disconnected!the!rig!from!the!blowout!preventer,!but!it!failed!as!well!(National!
Commission,!2011).!Although!Transocean!protocol!gives!no!mention!of!when,!or!if,!
the!EDS!should!be!activated,!the!subsea!supervisor!attempted!to!activate!it!within!
minutes!of!the!blowout!(BP,!2010).!In!order!to!do!so,!the!Offshore!Installation!
Manager’s!approval!was!needed,!meaning!there!was!a!slight!delay!due!to!
communication!(National!Commission,!2011).!Panel!indicators!lit!up,!so!activation!
appeared!to!be!successful.!However,!the!rig!never!actually!disconnected,!possibly!
due!to!damage!to!the!system!from!the!first!explosion!(BP,!2010).!(
A!BP!senior!manager,!Transocean!manager,!and!subsea!engineers!returned!
to!the!site!the!day!after!the!explosions!to!dispatch!an!ROV!to!the!blowout!preventer!
(National!Commission,!2011).!This!operation!was!undertaken!with!the!intention!of!
activating!the!blind!shear!ram!to!seal!the!well,!but!it!failed!to!do!so.!BP!accepted!
some!of!the!blame!for!this,!since!Transocean!policy!called!for!testing!of!the!ROV!
intervention!system!at!the!surface,!which!had!not!been!done!(BP,!2010).!
The!National!Commission’s!report!(2011)!uniquely!lists!failures!within!the!
industry!and!the!government!as!two!major!reasons!for!the!blowout,!placing!almost!
all!blame!on!ineffective!supervision!of!offshore!drilling,!and!specifically!on!MMS!as!a!
regulatory!agency!that!had!failed!in!enforcing!its!safety!regulations!for!years.!It!
points!out!that!the!industry!and!government!were!not!adequately!prepared!for!the!
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risks!involved!with!deepwater!drilling,!and!that!there!had!not!been!enough!reform!
in!industry!practices!and!government!policies!over!the!years!as!deepwater!drilling!
had!developed.!These!failures!went!beyond!BP!to!other!operators!in!the!industry!as!
well,!with!better!management!and!communication!cited!as!necessary!both!within!
and!among!companies.!Additionally,!key!engineering!and!rig!personnel!needed!
better!training.!The!duty!was!placed!on!BP!as!the!operator!to!have!coordinated!the!
various!corporate!cultures,!internal!procedures,!and!decisionQmaking!protocols!of!
the!contractors!involved!in!operations.!Specific!to!the!Macondo!well!blowout,!BP!
needed!a!better!engineering!perspective!present!throughout!the!end!of!the!process,!
as!peer!review!had!only!occurred!during!the!early!planning!stages!of!drilling.!This!
lack!of!expert!perspective!led!the!BP!Macondo!well!team!to!make!decisions!on!an!asQ
needed!basis,!without!proper!risk!analysis!or!specialist!review.!Examples!of!these!
decisions!included!the!choice!to!use!six!versus!twentyQone!centralizers!and!the!
many!alterations!made!to!the!temporary!abandonment!procedure.!The!entire!
decisionQmaking!process!on!site!lacked!risk!assessment!as!timeQ!and!moneyQsaving!
changes!were!made!to!plans.!The!report!highlights!nine!timesaving!decisions!that!
were!made!instead!of!their!less!risky!alternatives,!and!BP!was!named!as!either!
definitely!or!possibly!responsible!for!making!all!of!said!decisions!(See!Figure!1).!!
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Figure(1:(Examples(of(Decisions(That(Increased(Risk(at(Macondo(While(Potentially(Saving(Time(
Note:(From!Deep(Water:(The(Gulf(Oil(Disaster(and(the(Future(of(Offshore(Drilling,!National!Commission!on!the!BP!
Deepwater(Horizon!Oil!Spill!and!Offshore!Drilling!

!
Additionally,!the!report!states!that!it!is!“critical…that!companies!implement!
and!maintain!a!pervasive!topQdown!safety!culture…that!rewards!employees!and!
contractors!who!take!action!when!there!is!a!safety!concern!even!though!such!action!
costs!the!company!time!and!money”!(National!Commission,!2011,!p.!142),!indicating!
a!rewards!system!could!help!avoid!risk!in!this!industry.!When!there!is!not!adequate!
time!for!a!full!risk!analysis,!only!proven!alternatives!should!be!used,!but!this!was!not!
the!case!on!Deepwater(Horizon.!Furthermore,!Halliburton!did!not!have!controls!in!
place!to!make!sure!lab!testing!was!performed!in!a!timely!manner,!or!that!test!results!
were!gone!over!thoroughly,!either!internally!or!with!BP.!Although!BP!acknowledged!
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that!Halliburton!was!not!very!reliable!with!necessary,!timely!testing!of!cement,!they!
still!did!not!require!Halliburton!to!complete!the!tests!or!report!results!back!to!BP!
before!ordering!the!cement!job!to!begin.!This!again!highlights!BP’s!failure!to!
communicate!effectively!both!internally!and!with!contractors,!leading!to!critical!
decisions!being!made!without!full!knowledge!of!context.!For!example,!the!rig!crew!
was!not!notified!of!the!difficulties!surrounding!the!primary!cement!job,!so!they!were!
not!as!cautious!when!performing!negative!pressure!tests!and!monitoring!the!well!
(National!Commission,!2011).!!
BP!is!not!the!only!company!blamed!for!lack!of!communication!in!the!report.!
Although!it!did!not!result!in!disaster,!in!December!2009!another!Transocean!rig!had!
a!similar!incident!in!the!North!Sea.!Transocean!failed!to!communicate!the!lessons!
learned!from!this!to!its!crew.!The!earlier!incident!also!occurred!while!displacing!
mud!with!seawater,!and!the!negative!pressure!test!was!also!incorrectly!deemed!
successful.!Hydrocarbons!entered!the!well,!and!mud!spewed!onto!the!rig!floor,!but!
the!crew!was!able!to!successfully!shut!in!the!well!before!a!blowout!occurred.!The!
incident!cost!the!crew!11.2!days!of!work!and!more!than!5!million!British!pounds!in!
expenses!(National!Commission,!2011).!An!internal!PowerPoint!about!the!incident!
stated:!“[f]luid!displacements!for!inflow!test![negative!test]!and!well!clean!up!
operations!are!not!adequately!covered!in!our!well!control!manual!or!adequately!
cover!displacements!in!under!balanced!operations”!(National!Commission,!2011,!p.!
140),!indicating!more!vigilance!was!necessary,!as!well!as!perhaps!an!updated!well!
control!manual.!This!PowerPoint!was!never!shown!to!the!Deepwater(Horizon!crew.!
An!“operations!advisory”!was!sent!out!in!April!2010!to!some!rigs!in!the!North!Sea,!
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reiterating!lessons!learned,!and!“mandatory”!actions!were!set!forth,!including!
specified!operations!for!when!only!a!single!mechanical!barrier!is!present,!such!as!
was!the!case!on!Deepwater(Horizon.!However,!again,!the!Deepwater(Horizon(crew!
never!saw!these!advisements!(National!Commission,!2011).!!
The!National!Commission’s!report!(2011)!places!ultimate!blame!for!the!
incident!on!regulatory!agencies.!In!the!investigation!of!MMS!after!the!Deepwater(
Horizon(blowout,!“MMS!staff…reported!that!leasing!coordinators!and!managers!
discouraged!them!from!reaching!conclusions!about!potential!environmental!impacts!
that!would!increase!the!burden!on!lessees,!‘thus!causing!unnecessary!delay!for!
operators’”!(National!Commission,!2011,!p.!98).!It!was!also!discovered!that!MMS!
managers!altered!scientists’!findings!about!environmental!impact!in!order!to!
expedite!plan!approvals;!there!may!have!been!employee!financial!incentive!to!meet!
deadlines!for!leasing!or!development!approvals.!Furthermore,!MMS!regulations!did!
not!fully!address!the!new!practice!of!deepwater!drilling.!For!example,!there!was!no!
requirement!or!protocol!for!conducting!and!interpreting!a!negative!pressure!test.!
The!government!is!blamed!when!the!report!states!that!“efforts!to!expand!regulatory!
oversight,!tighten!safety!requirements,!and!provide!funding!to!equip!regulators!with!
the!resources,!personnel,!and!training!needed!to!be!effective!were!either!overtly!
resisted!or!not!supported!by!the!industry,!members!of!Congress,!and!several!
administrations”!(National!Commission,!2011,!p.!142).!MMS!not!only!lacked!
resources!and!political!support,!but!also!personnel!with!proper!expertise!and!
training.!For!example,!they!made!the!decision!to!approve!BP’s!request!to!set!the!
cement!plug!3300!feet!below!the!mud!line!in!less!than!ninety!minutes!simply!
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because!BP!convinced!the!approving!official!that!this!was!necessary!for!setting!the!
lockdown!sleeve.!The!fact!that!there!was!an!MMS!regulation!that!plugs!cannot!be!set!
more!than!1000!feet!below!the!mud!line!except!in!special!situations!was!overlooked.!
Finally,!MMS!engineering’s!review!of!the!temporary!abandonment!plan!relied!on!
initial!well!design,!and!lacked!a!full!risk!assessment!(National!Commission,!2011).!
The!stories!told!by!the!selected!investigations!list!similar!events!leading!to!
the!blowout!of!the!Macondo!well!and!subsequent!well!control!efforts,!however!each!
report!places!emphasis!on!different!parts!of!the!decisionQmaking!process.!Read!
alone,!each!report!cites!specific!blame!for!each!mistake!made!during!operations,!but!
upon!comparison,!it!becomes!clear!that!fault!is!not!so!straightforward.!The!complex!
nature!of!the!industry!and!relationships!between!agencies!within!it!results!in!a!
convoluted!narrative!with!a!lack!of!third!party!verifiability.!
!

!
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2.12(Glossary(
(
Annular(preventer:!“large,!donutQshaped!rubber!elements…that!encircle!drill!pipe!
or!casing!inside!the![blowout!preventer]”!(National!Commission,!2011,!p.!109);!
must!be!shut!to!seal!off!annulus!around!the!drill!pipe!(National!Commission,!2011)!
!
Annulus:!space!“between!the!exterior!of!the!steel!casing!and!the!surrounding!rock!
formations”!(National!Commission,!2011,!p.!114)!
!
“Bladder(effect”:(“heavy!mud!in!the!riser!was!exerting!pressure!on!the!annular!
preventer,!which!in!turn!transmitted!pressure!to!the!drill!pipe”!(National!
Commission,!2011,!p.!123);!no!evidence!that!this!phenomenon!actually!exists!
(National!Commission,!2011)!
!
Blind(shear(ram:!“designed!to!cut!through!drill!pipe!inside!the![blowout!preventer]!
to!seal!off!the!well!in!emergency!situations…could!be!activated!manually!by!
drillers…by!an!ROV,!or!by!an!automated!emergency!‘deadman!system’”!(National!
Commission,!2011,!p.!109)!
!
Blowout(preventer:!large!mechanical!device!installed!as!the!“last!line!of!defense!
against!loss!of!well!control”!(National!Commission,!2011,!p.!13);!seals,!controls,!and!
monitors!well!(National!Commission,!2011,!p.!13)!
!
“Bottoms(up”(circulation:!“all!of!the!existing!mud!in!the!wellbore!is!displaced!with!
fresh!mud…removes!unwanted!debris!and!conditions!the!mud”;!“The!American!
Petroleum!Institute!(API)!recommended!practice!suggests!circulating!a!full!bottomsQ
up!prior!to!cementing”!(Transocean,!2011,!p.!55);!allows!for!detection!of!the!
presence!of!hydrocarbons!at!the!well’s!bottom!(National!Commission,!2011)!
(

!
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BP(zonal(isolation(experts:(in!charge!of!monitoring!different!zones!that!may!have!
different!pressures!or!fluids,!and!keeping!them!separate!(BP,!2010)!
!
BPM:(barrels!per!minute;!measure!of!flow!rate!in!well!(Transocean,!2011)!
(
Casing:!“series!of!steel!tubes…creates!a!foundation!for!continued!drilling!by!
reinforcing!upper!portions!of!the!hole!as!drilling!progresses”;!“after!installing!a!
casing!string,!the!crews!drill!farther,!sending!each!successive!string!of!casing!down!
through!the!prior!ones,!so!the!well’s!diameter!becomes!progressively!smaller!as!it!
gets!deeper”!(National!Commission,!2011,!p.!107)!
!
Cement(plug:(engineers!send!cement!down!to!the!bottom!of!the!well,!then!pump!
mud!after!it!until!cement!is!pushed!back!up!into!the!annular!space;!“if!done!
properly,!the!slug!of!cement!will!create!a!long!and!continuous!seal!around!the!
production!casing,!and!will!fill!the!shoe!track!in!the!bottom!of!the!final!casing!string”!
(National!Commission,!2011,!p.!115)!
!
Centralizers:(installed!to!hold!casing!string!in!the!center!of!the!wellbore;!“cement!
pumped!down!the!casing!will!flow!evenly!back!up!the!annulus,!displacing!any!mud!
and!debris!that!were!previously!in!that!space!and!leaving!a!clean!column!of!
cement…if!the!casing!is!not!centered,!the!cement!will!flow!preferentially!up…the!
larger!spaces!in!the!annulus…and!slowly!or!not!at!all!in!the!narrower!annular!
space…can!leave!behind!channels!of!drilling!mud!that!can!severely!compromise!a!
primary!cement!job!by!creating!paths!and!gaps!through!which!pressurized!
hydrocarbons!can!flow”!(National!Commission,!2011,!p.!112)!
!
Damon(Bankston:(offshore!supply!vessel!owned!by!Tidewater!Marine!and!
contracted!by!BP!to!carry!supplies!“such!as!drilling!equipment,!drilling!chemicals,!
food,!fuel!oil,!and!water!to!and!from!the!Deepwater(Horizon”!(Transocean,!2011,!p.!
18);!provided!emergency!assistance!during!blowout!(Transocean,!2011)!
!
!
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“Deadman”(system:(automatic!mode!function!on!blowout!preventer;!should!trigger!
“the!blind!shear!ram!after!the!power,!communication,!and!hydraulics!connections!
between!the!rig!and!the![blowout!preventer]![are]!cut”!(National!Commission,!2011,!
p.!131)!
!
Displacement:(replacing!contents!of!riser!with!other!contents;!in!this!case,!
replacing!mud!with!seawater!and!viceQversa!(National!Commission,!2011)!
(
Diverter(system:(“provides!two!alternate!paths!for!gas!or!gasQbearing!mud!
returning!to!the!rig!from!the!well”!(National!Commission,!2011,!p.!130);!can!be!
diverted!to!mud!gas!separator!or!overboard!(National!Commission,!2011)(
!
Drill(pipe:(steel!piping!that!runs!down!through!the!well!to!allow!for!fluids!to!be!
pumped!down!(Transocean,!2011)!
!
Drilling(mud:!plays!a!role!in!controlling!hydrocarbon!pressure;!“used!to!lubricate!
and!cool!the!drill!bit!during!drilling”;!“sophisticated!blend!of!synthetic!fluids,!
polymers,!and!weighting!agents!that!often!costs!over!$100!per!barrel”!(National!
Commission,!2011,!p.!107)!
!
Emergency(disconnect(system((EDS):(“designed!to!close!the!blind!shear!rams!
(BSRs)!and!detach!the![riser]!so!that!the!rig!can!move!away”!(Transocean,!2011,!p.!
137)!
!
Float(collar:(“installed!at!the!top!of!the!shoe!track!to!prevent!the!cement!from!
flowing!back!from!the!outside!of!the!casing!to!the!inside!of!the!casing!when!pumping!
stops”!(Transocean,!2011,!p.!49)!
!
Halliburton:!company!contracted!for!cement!job!and!support!on!and!offshore!
(Transocean,!2011)!
!
!
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Hydrocarbon:!organic!compound!found!in!crude!oil!(National!Commission,!2011)!
(
“Kick”:!unplanned!influx!of!gas!or!fluid!that!pushes!mud!upward!faster!and!faster,!
reducing!pressure!on!gas!and!increasing!speed!of!kick;!oil!and!gas!enter!the!well!if!
mud!weight!is!too!low!(National!Commission,!2011)!
!
Kill(line:!“one!of!three!pipes…that!run!from!rig!to!the![blowout!preventer]!to!allow!
the!crew!to!circulate!fluids!into!and!out!of!the!well!at!the!sea!floor”!(National!
Commission,!2011,!p.!123)!
!
Liner:(“shorter!string!of!casing!hung!lower!in!the!well!and!anchored!to!the!next!
higher!string”!(National!Commission,!2011,!p.!111)!
!
Lockdown(sleeve:!“mechanical!device!that!locks!the!longQstring!casing!to!the!
wellhead!to!prevent!it!from!lifting!out!of!place!during!subsequent!production!
operations”!(National!Commission,!2011,!p.!120);!usually!set!by!completion!rig,!but!
BP!chose!to!have!Deepwater(Horizon!place!it,!with!the!theory!that!they!would!do!it!
faster!(National!Commission,!2011)!
!
Long_string(production(casing:!also!known!as!casing!string;!“single!continuous!
wall!of!steel!between!the!wellhead!on!the!seafloor,!and!the!oil!and!gas!zone!at!the!
bottom!of!the!well”!(National!Commission,!2011,!p.!111)!
!
“Lost(returns”(or(“lost(circulation”:!when!pressure!of!drilling!fluids!is!too!high,!
rock!at!the!bottom!of!the!well!will!fracture!and!“drilling!fluids!will!flow!out!of!the!
wellbore!into!the!formation!instead!of!circulating!back!to!the!surface”!(National!
Commission,!2011,!p.!106)!
!
M_I(SWACO:!subsidiary!of!Schlumberger;!drillingQmud!subcontractor!(National!
Commission,!2011)!
!
!
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Mud(gas(separator:(part!of!diverter!system;!“consists!of!a!series!of!pipes,!valves,!
and!a!tank!configured!to!remove!gas!entrained!in!relatively!small!amounts!of!
mud…the!gas!is!then!vented!from!an!outlet!valve!located!high!on!the!derrick”!
(National!Commission,!2011,!p.!130)!
!
Mudloggers:!employed!by!Sperry!Sun!“to!monitor!the![well!monitoring]!system,!
interpret!the!data!it!generated,!and!detect!influxes!of!hydrocarbons,!or!kicks”!
(Transocean,!2011,!p.!18)!
!
The(National(Oceanic(and(Atmospheric(Administration((NOAA):(part!of!the!
United!States!Department!of!Commerce;!responsible!for!protection!of!coastal!and!
ocean!resources!
(
Negative(pressure(test:(“performed!before!the!mud!in!the!wellbore!and!riser!is!
displaced!with!seawater…confirms!the!integrity!of!barriers!in!the!well!(such!as!
cement!barriers,!mechanical!barriers,!casing,!and!seal!assembly)!by!simulating!the!
reduction!in!hydrostatic!pressure!that!occurs!when!heavy!mud!is!displaced!with!
lighter!seawater,!and!the![blowout!preventer]!stack!and!the!riser!are!removed”!
(Transocean,!2011,!p.!29)!
!
Nitrogen(foam(cement:(cement!with!nitrogen!foam!injected!into!it!“to!lower!its!
density!and!thus!the!pressure!on…fragile!formations”!(Transocean,!2011,!p.!56)!
!
Oceaneering:(subsea!engineering!and!technology!company;!provided!remotely!
operated!vehicle!(ROV)!technicians!(Transocean,!2011)!
!
OCS(Group:(engineering!and!consulting!firm!in!oil!and!gas!industry;!provides!
management,!inspection,!and!other!technical!services!(National!Commission,!2011)!
!
Offshore(Installation(Manager((OIM):!Transocean’s!senior!manager!on!board!
Deepwater(Horizon((Transocean,!2011)!
!
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OptiCem:!computer!simulations!program!used!to!help!predict!the!outcome!of!the!
cement!job!based!on!the!variables!(National!Commission,!2011)!
!
Pore(pressure:!“pressure!exerted!by!fluids!in!the!pore!space!of!rock”!(National!
Commission,!2011,!p.!106);!needs!to!be!balanced!with!pressure!from!drilling!fluids!
to!prevent!hydrocarbons!from!entering!the!wellbore!(National!Commission,!2011)!
!
Positive(pressure(test:(tests!the!integrity!of!the!production!casing!(National!
Commission,!2011)!
!
Resource(and(Conservation(Recovery(Act:(1976;!main!governance!over!disposal!
of!hazardous!waste!(National!Commission,!2011)!
!
Riser:(“the!pipe!that!connected!the!rig!to!the!well!assembly!on!the!seafloor!below”!
(National!Commission,!2011,!p.!23)!
!
Schlumberger:!company!contracted!to!provide!specialized!well!and!cement!logging!
services,!including!equipment!and!personnel;!owns!MQI!SWACO!(Transocean,!2011)!
!
Sheen(test:(“performed!to!verify!that!the!displacement!of!synthetic!oilQbased!mud!
was!complete!and!that!it!was!appropriate!to!discharge!the!remaining!waterQbased!
fluids!in!the!riser!overboard!into!the!sea”!(Transocean,!2011,!p.!30);!used!a!sample!
of!well!fluids!coming!from!the!riser!(Transocean,!2011)!
!
Shoe(track:!“end!section!of!the!casing…contains!cement!that,!together!with!cement!
in!the!annulus,!serves!as!the!primary!barrier!preventing!the!hydrocarbons!in!the!
reservoir!from!flowing!up!the!well…acts!as!a!plug!between!the!inside!of!the!casing!
and!the!formation”!(Transocean,!2011,!p.!44)!
!
“Slip_on”(centralizers:(“devices!that!slide!onto!the!exterior!of!a!piece!of!casing!
where!they!are!normally!secured!in!place!by!mechanical!‘stop!collars’!on!either!
!
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side”;!distrusted!because!of!these!separate!stop!collars!that!“can!slide!out!of!position!
or…catch!on!other!equipment!as!the!casing!is!lowered”!(National!Commission,!2011,!
p.!112)!
!
Solenoid(valves:(“energized!to!activate!the!highQpressure!shear!circuit!for!30!
seconds!when![deadman!system]!is!activated”!(Transocean,!2011,!p.!147)!
!
Spacer(fluids:(“any!fluid!used!to!physically!separate!one!drilling!fluid!from!another!
and!to!avoid!contamination!between!the!two”!(Transocean,!2011,!p.!90);!usually!
waterQbased,!but!BP!uniquely!chose!to!“create!a!spacer!out!of!two!different!lostQ
circulation!materials!left!over!on!the!rig”!(National!Commission,!2011,!p.!122)!
!
Sperry(Sun:!subsidiary!of!Halliburton;!contracted!to!install!monitoring!system!on!
rig;!employed!mudloggers!who!monitored!the!system!(Transocean,!2011)!
!
Subsea(personnel:!BP!employees;!record!well!controlQrelated!equipment!
maintenance!(BP,!2010)!
!
Toolpusher:!part!of!drilling!crew!from!Transocean;!in!charge!of!drillers!and!
assistant!drillers!(Transocean,!2011)!
!
Transocean:!contracted!to!provide!rig!(initially!Marianas,!and!later,!Deepwater(
Horizon)!and!crew!(Transocean,!2011)!
!
Underbalancing:(“allowing!pressure!in!the!formations!to!exceed!pressure!in!the!
well”!(Transocean,!2011,!p.!78)!
!
Variable(bore(rams:!“can!close!around!a!range!of!tubing!and!drill!pipe!outside!
diameters”!(Transocean,!2011,!p.!141)!
!

!
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Weatherford:!contracted!for!technology!such!as!centralizers,!float!collar,!and!shoe!
track,!as!well!as!personnel!to!help!advise!installation!and!operation!of!their!
equipment!(Transocean,!2011)!
!
Well(Site(Leader:!BP’s!authority!on!board!Deepwater(Horizon!(BP,!2010)!
!
Wellbore:!“hole!drilled!by!the!rig,!including!the!casing”!(National!Commission,!
2011,!p.!106)!
(
Wells(Team(Leader:!from!BP;!supervises!managers!(National!Commission,!2011)!
!
!

!

!
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Chapter(III(
Economic(Context:(The(Principal_Agent(Model(
(
!

!
With(the(story(of(the(Deepwater!Horizon(disaster(pieced(together,(the(next(step(is(to(
examine(the(analytical(framework(through(which(potential(mechanisms(of(an(optimal(
enforcement(strategy(can(be(determined.(The(principalCagent(model(was(selected(as(
this(framework(due(to(the(flawed(contractual(relationships(on(all(levels(of(the(offshore(
drilling(industry(and(subsequent(lack(of(oversight(of(drilling(operations(that(led(to(the(
Macondo(well(blowout.(Thus,(it(is(important(to(understand(principalCagent(
relationships(and(how(problems(within(them(can(be(resolved.(
!
Incentive!theory!focuses!on!tasks!that!are!too!complicated!or!too!costly!for!a!
profitQmaximizing!individual,!such!as!a!principal,!to!perform!himself.!An!agent!is!a!
utilityQmaximizing!individual!contracted!by!a!principal!to!perform!said!task,!chosen!
because!he!possesses!some!special!knowledge!that!will!help!him!carry!out!the!task!
better!than!the!principal!could!have!(Sappington,!1991).!These!two!parties!often!
have!different!objectives,!and!the!principalQagent!problem!arises!from!the!need!to!
align!these!objectives!(Laffont!&!Martimont,!2001).!
!When!selecting!an!optimal!agent,!a!principal!takes!several!factors!into!
account,!including!who!will!cost!him!the!least!and!who!will!be!most!reliable.!
Additionally,!he!must!balance!the!policy!instruments!used!to!attract!agents.!For!
example,!although!a!high!interest!rate!would!bring!a!bank!high!returns!on!successful!
loans,!the!interest!rate!cannot!be!raised!too!high!because!it!will!deter!people!with!
!
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relatively!reliable!ideas,!and!not!those!with!risky!ones.!Since!people!with!more!risky!
ideas!are!more!likely!to!default!to!bankruptcy!and!never!repay!interest,!a!high!rate!
will!not!dissuade!them!from!taking!out!a!loan!(Sappington,!1991).!!
Conflicting!objectives!and!decentralized!information!are!the!fundamental!
problems!of!the!principalQagent!model.!A!principal!has!the!objective!to!provide!the!
least!incentives!possible,!while!still!motivating!the!agent!to!perform!well,!whereas!
an!agent!wants!to!receive!the!most!incentives!possible,!while!performing!at!a!
comfortable!level.!Additionally,!both!parties!are!privy!to!information!the!other!is!
not,!especially!an!agent!who!is!cognizant!of!his!full!effort!capacity!(Laffont!&!
Martimont,!2001).!Once!a!contract!has!been!agreed!upon,!a!principal!has!no!way!of!
perfectly!monitoring!an!agent’s!behavior,!and!must!instead!trust!the!agent!to!
perform!efficiently!and!to!the!best!of!his!abilities.!For!example,!when!a!principal!has!
alternate!agents!available,!a!contracted!agent!is!incentivized!to!perform!better!at!a!
lower!cost!to!the!principal.!However,!the!agent!may!not!implement!strategies!to!
improve!his!future!performance!if!he!fears!he!might!be!replaced.!The!principal’s!
problem!arises!in!how!to!motivate!an!agent!to!perform!with!a!high!level!of!effort,!
even!though!he!has!imperfect!information!regarding!his!agent’s!activities!
(Sappington,!1991),!as!exemplified!in!the!offshore!drilling!industry!and!Deepwater(
Horizon!case!study.!
Agents!have!private!information!of!two!types:!adverse!selection!and!moral!
hazard.!Adverse!selection,!or!hidden!knowledge,!is!any!information!an!agent!has!
regarding!cost!or!value!of!his!actions!that!his!principal!is!unaware!of.!When!he!
chooses!to!use!this!information!to!his!advantage,!he!is!participating!in!adverse!
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selection.!For!example,!only!an!agent!can!know!exactly!how!quickly!and!efficiently!
he!can!perform!a!task,!while!his!principal!can!only!assume!he!is!performing!to!the!
best!of!his!ability.!Moral!hazard,!or!hidden!action,!is!anything!an!agent!does!that!his!
principal!cannot!or!does!not!observe!him!doing.!For!example,!an!agent!might!spend!
an!hour!on!a!task!that!he!could!actually!effectively!complete!in!thirty!minutes,!but!
his!principal!would!have!no!way!of!knowing!this.!A!third!problem!regarding!
information!is!nonverifiability,!which!arises!when!there!is!no!third!party!to!observe!
information!a!principal!and!agent!both!know.!For!example,!if!a!principal!and!agent!
are!both!aware!of!potential!outcomes!from!their!contract,!but!unsure!of!what!the!
value!of!the!actual!outcome!will!be,!they!cannot!contract!upon!it!and!thus!a!third!
party!cannot!verify!the!information!(Laffont!&!Martimont,!2001).!
Adverse!selection!stems!from!the!fact!that!an!agent!is!hired!by!a!principal!to!
perform!a!duty!the!principal!is!unable!to!complete!as!well!himself.!By!performing!
this!duty,!the!agent!gains!knowledge!and!information!unknown!to!his!principal,!
including!“the!exact!opportunity!cost!of![the]!task,!the!precise!technology!used,!
[and/or]!how!good!is!the!matching!between!the!agent’s!intrinsic!ability!and!this!
knowledge”!(Laffont!&!Martimont,!2001,!p.!37).!In!some!cases,!an!agent!is!able!to!
use!this!to!his!advantage!when!agreeing!to!or!working!under!a!contract.!Due!to!
adverse!selection,!when!possible,!principals!often!choose!to!include!information!in!
the!initial!contract!that!can!be!verified!by!a!third!party,!such!as!quantity!produced.!
Additionally,!a!principal!has!ways!to!improve!the!information!available!to!him!
through!setting!up!monitoring!and!auditing!structures,!such!as!hidden!cameras.!If!
the!principal,!agent,!and!a!third!party!can!observe!a!signal!after!the!agent!has!done!
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some!work,!the!contract!can!reflect!both!what!the!agent!says!and!what!the!signal!
indicates!(Laffont!&!Martimont,!2001).!A!principal!can!also!deal!with!the!issue!of!
hidden!information!by!linking!reports!between!two!agents!in!similar!environments!
who!would!encounter!similar!problems.!For!example,!two!tenant!farmers!working!
on!adjacent!pieces!of!land!would!endure!the!same!unpredictable!weather!
conditions.!Thus,!their!landlord!(the!principal)!could!expect!similar!results!from!
both!harvests!and!incentivize!honest!hard!work!by!either!comparing!the!reports!or!
making!his!two!agents!report!on!the!conditions!of!not!only!their!own!harvests,!but!
also!each!other’s.!However,!in!this!case,!the!agents!could!work!together!to!thwart!
their!principal!by!choosing!to!underreport.!To!counter!this,!the!principal!might!offer!
incentive!for!one!agent!to!“tell!on”!the!other!(Sappington,!1991).!The!problem!of!
adverse!selection!can!be!difficult!to!avoid,!since!the!contract!is!often!made!before!
the!agent!learns!information!about!his!performance!abilities!(Laffont!&!Martimont,!
2001).!!
Moral!hazard!arises!because!an!agent!can!perform!actions!that!are!
unobservable!by!both!his!principal!and!a!third!party,!such!as!a!Court!of!Justice.!
Without!verification!of!the!value!of!such!actions,!a!contract!cannot!cover!them.!
Effort!level!of!an!agent’s!performance!is!central!here,!as!well!as!his!personal!
objectives!and!motivations.!The!value!and!amount!of!output!produced!is!directly!
affected!by!how!much!effort!the!agent!chooses!to!put!forward.!For!example,!a!
regulated!firm!may!make!investment!decisions!that!will!reduce!costs!for!producing!
a!socially!valuable!good,!but!these!decisions!will!be!unobservable!to!the!regulator.!
As!with!adverse!selection,!asymmetric!information!leads!to!uncertainty!here,!since!a!
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principal!can!never!really!know!the!extent!of!effort!his!agent!is!capable!of!putting!
forth.!However,!once!production!does!occur,!the!results!can!be!verified.!Production!
level!is!directly!related!to!the!level!of!effort!an!agent!puts!forth.!This!means!a!
principal!can!indirectly!contract!an!agent’s!effort!by!judging!it!based!on!output!
(Laffont!&!Martimont,!2001).!
An!incentive!scheme!that!works!well!for!resolving!moral!hazard!is!one!that!
induces!positive!and!costly!effort.!Incentive!feasible!contracts!are!those!that!satisfy!
the!constraints!of!incentives!and!of!voluntary!participation.!In!essence,!a!principal!
must!devise!a!contract!that!will!incentivize!his!agent!to!perform!well!at!a!reasonable!
cost!to!the!principal,!and!the!contract!will!be!devised!“ex!ante”,!or!before!production!
occurs.!This!generally!leads!to!the!principal!choosing!the!“secondQbest!cost”!for!
inducing!effort!from!his!agent.!As!this!is!a!tradeQoff!for!“secondQbest!effort”,!there!is!
an!allocative!inefficiency!due!to!the!conflicting!objectives.!In!the!case!of!riskQneutral!
agents,!nonQobservability!does!not!pose!a!problem.!If!a!riskQneutral!agent!works!
hard!and!produces!sufficient!output,!he!will!be!rewarded;!if!not,!he!will!be!
penalized.!However,!as!long!as!he!receives!his!contracted!reservation!level—or!
minimum!compensation!requirement—at!the!least,!he!will!be!satisfied.!This!is!
known!as!his!participation!constraint.!Sometimes,!an!agent!can!be!induced!to!exhibit!
his!best!efforts!by!making!him!the!residual!claimant!in!terms!of!gains.!In!cases!of!
riskQaverse!agents,!an!agent!must!be!required!to!bear!some!burden!of!the!risk!
associated!with!insufficient!production!in!order!to!give!him!any!incentive!to!work!
hard.!The!agent!must!get!a!risk!premium!when!he!accepts!this!contract,!and!will!be!
induced!to!exhibit!less!effort!than!a!riskQneutral!agent!(Laffont!&!Martimont,!2001).!!
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Nonverifiability!arises!when!there!is!some!parameter!affecting!future!payQoff!
in!a!relationship!that!cannot!be!determined!by!a!principal!and!his!agent!upon!
entering!their!relationship.!Therefore,!when!they!create!their!contract,!there!is!no!
third!party!that!can!enforce!said!contract,!as!no!third!party!can!verify!if!the!
statements!of!either!party!involved!are!true!or!false.!In!these!cases,!the!principal!and!
agent!sometimes!decide!to!make!the!contract!“ex!post”,!or!after!the!fact,!when!they!
can!bargain!over!the!now!commonly!understood!results!of!their!relationship.!This!
works!well!with!a!riskQneutral!agent!(Laffont!&!Martimont,!2001).!
When!creating!a!contract,!decisions!must!be!made!regarding!different!
aspects!of!how!it!will!be!enforced.!One!such!decision!regards!the!choice!between!
negligence!and!strict!liability!rule!in!scenarios!where!offsite!damage!may!occur!
based!on!the!level!of!care!exerted!by!an!agent.!In!the!case!of!a!negligence!rule,!a!
third!party!Court!of!Justice!imposes!a!certain!due!care!standard.!If!the!agent!exerts!
care!greater!than!or!equal!to!this,!his!principal’s!losses!will!be!internal—only!losing!
elements!such!as!the!assets!needed!for!production.!Conversely,!if!the!agent!exerts!
effort!below!the!due!care!standard,!his!principal’s!losses!will!be!both!internal!and!
external—not!only!will!resources!be!lost,!but!also!legal!compensation!may!be!owed!
to!victims!affected!by!the!agent’s!lack!of!care.!In!the!case!of!a!strict!liability!rule,!a!
principal!must!pay!damages!to!victims!regardless!of!the!level!of!care!that!was!
exerted!by!his!agent.!Courts!need!to!take!moral!hazard!into!account!when!
determining!the!due!care!standard!to!set!under!a!negligence!rule!(Newman!&!
Wright,!1992).!The!offshore!drilling!industry!includes!moral!hazard!on!many!levels.!
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In!addition!to!decisions!that!must!be!made!while!devising!a!contract,!many!
different!“frictions”!can!arise!between!a!principal!and!agent.!Asymmetry!of!preQ
contractual!beliefs!is!a!friction!that!occurs!if!a!principal!and!agent!have!different!
beliefs!about!contingencies!that!may!arise!during!the!term!of!the!contract.!In!this!
case,!the!principal!will!modify!the!contract!based!on!what!his!agent!knows!or!
doesn’t!know!in!order!to!get!what!he!wants!from!it.!For!example,!in!the!case!of!the!
landlord!and!tenant!farmer,!the!two!parties!may!anticipate!different!weather!
conditions!that!would!in!turn!affect!production!levels.!This!will!alter!how!the!
principal!and!agent!negotiate!the!initial!contract!(Sappington,!1991).!!
RiskQaverse!agents!lead!to!frictions!in!contract!formation!as!well.!Because!the!
agent!cannot!be!expected!to!bear!the!full!burden!of!the!consequences!if!due!to!
circumstances!beyond!his!control!his!performance!is!poor,!the!principal!must!
account!for!these!kinds!of!extenuating!circumstances!in!the!contract.!Often,!the!
principal!offers!the!agent!excess!payment!above!his!reservation!level.!However,!this!
leads!to!a!new!problem!for!the!principal:!because!the!agent!is!offered!such!a!high!
payment!from!the!outset,!his!incentives!to!perform!to!the!best!of!his!abilities!
diminish.!Additionally,!the!agent!is!essentially!insured!against!bad!outcomes,!
meaning!he!will!exert!less!effort!to!avoid!these!outcomes!(Sappington,!1991).!!
The!negotiability!and!nonQbinding!nature!of!contracts!causes!friction!in!that!
outside!forces!often!allow!for!changes!to!the!commitment!of!both!parties.!For!
example,!an!agent!can!terminate!his!contract!in!situations!where!he!is!not!making!at!
or!above!his!reservation!level.!Thus,!his!principal!often!designs!a!contract!in!which!
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the!agent!shares!some!of!the!surplus!of!his!labors.!This!incentivizes!the!agent!to!
exert!more!effort,!albeit!not!necessarily!to!his!full!potential!(Sappington,!1991).!
Public!observability!is!a!common!friction!of!principalQagent!relationships.!
Although!a!contract!can!be!enforced!through!a!principal!and!agent!regularly!
verifying!the!agent’s!performance,!if!no!third!party!can!confirm!this,!many!
intangibles!arise!(Sappington,!1991).!
An!incentive!problem!often!seen!in!centrallyQplanned!economies!where!the!
government!uses!past!performance!to!set!future!goals!is!underperformance!by!an!
agent,!who!will!not!want!to!set!the!bar!too!high!the!first!time.!This!can!be!alleviated!
when!the!productive!environment!varies!over!time,!since!this!makes!it!easier!for!a!
principal!to!induce!his!agent!to!tailor!performance!accordingly.!When!a!varying!
productive!environment!is!not!available,!the!principal!can!benefit!similarly!by!
changing!his!agent’s!tasks.!Again,!agents!will!perform!better!if!they!know!they!are!
not!setting!a!bar!they!will!need!to!continually!reach!(Sappington,!1991).!!
!
!

!
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Chapter(IV(
Literature(Review(
(
Although(little(literature(exists(that(applies(the(principalCagent(model(to(problems(
within(the(offshore(drilling(industry,(previous(research(and(studies(of(industries(with(
high(risk(for(negative(externalities(and(environmental(damage(have(examined(firm(
behavior(in(the(light(of(the(principalCagent(model(and(incentive(schemes.(Economists(
have(attempted(to(devise(enforcement(structures(that(incentivize(the(promotion(of(
safety(cultures(and(socially(optimal(outcomes.(As(Deepwater!Horizon(occurred(
recently(and(set(a(new(precedent(for(the(damages(that(can(be(caused(by(a(lack(of(
incentives(for(safety(precautions,(there(is(insufficient(contemporary(literature(on(the(
mechanisms(for(an(optimal(enforcement(strategy(for(industries(with(high(risk(for(
negative(externalities.(An(examination(of(the(literature(that(does(exist(is(beneficial(for(
determination(of(the(potential(components(of(a(contemporary(optimal(strategy.(
!
4.1(Why(Do(Firms(Comply(with(Enforcement?(
Cohen!(1998)!examines!why!firms!comply!with!enforcement,!as!well!as!the!
motivation!for!said!enforcement.!Overall,!he!states!that!firms!choose!to!comply!
based!on!negative!and!positive!incentives!(Cohen,!1998).!Lazear!(1998)!examines!
this!idea!in!the!context!of!bonus!and!penalty!schemes!that!result!in!the!same!
compensation,!and!why!each!produces!different!results.!Psychologically,!workers!
are!attracted!to!schemes!where!they!are!rewarded!rather!than!schemes!where!they!
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will!probably!be!penalized,!and!would!only!prefer!a!penalty!scheme!if!it!resulted!in!
more!compensation.!Each!scheme!provides!different!incentives,!so!firms!need!to!be!
aware!of!what!they!are!incentivizing!when!devising!a!contract.!Penalty!schemes!“are!
used!when!adding!output!or!effort!beyond!some!point!has!no!value”!(Lazear,!1998,!
p.!367).!For!example,!when!working!on!an!assembly!line,!getting!to!work!before!a!
shift!starts!has!no!more!value!than!getting!to!work!on!time.!Penalty!schemes!are!
used!when!there!is!a!maximum!amount!of!value!like!this!that!can!be!achieved,!and!
workers!are!punished!only!when!they!work!below!the!critical!level.!Bonus!schemes!
“are!used!when!reducing!output!or!effort!below!some!point!has!no!cost”!(Lazear,!
1998,!p.!367).!For!example,!setting!up!a!Halloween!display!before!Halloween!has!
increasing!value!the!earlier!it!is!set!up.!Bonus!schemes!are!used!when!there!is!a!
critical!level!of!value!that!must!be!achieved,!and!workers!are!rewarded!for!reaching!
this!target!level!sooner!(Lazear,!1998).!Cohen!(1998)!deals!with!negative!and!
positive!enforcement!on!the!firm!level.!If,!for!example,!a!fine!for!noncompliance!is!
too!low,!a!firm!will!not!have!enough!incentive!to!comply.!CostQsubsidies!are!one!
option!for!increasing!compliance,!because!they!affect!the!costQbenefit!analysis!
performed!by!firms!when!making!compliance!decisions.!Additionally,!because!most!
firms!are!riskQaverse,!after!an!initial!incident!they!will!be!more!stringently!regulated!
and!have!incentive!to!be!more!cautious.!Aligning!the!interests!of!the!firm!with!
shareholders!can!help!with!firm!compliance!because!shareholders!often!desire!firms!
to!have!a!strong!safety!culture.!Cohen!(1998)!points!out!noneconomic!incentives!for!
compliance,!such!as!social!norms!and!general!sentiments!of!rule!following!(when!
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rules!are!considered!fair),!which!are!often!overlooked!when!economists!examine!
firms’!compliance!decisions!(Cohen,!1998).!
!
4.2(Resolving(Moral(Hazard(
The!issue!of!moral!hazard!often!arises!among!industries!with!high!risk!for!
negative!externalities.!Many!economists!have!tackled!the!question!of!what!kind!of!
enforcement!strategy!works!best!for!these!scenarios.!Page!(1991)!creates!a!model!
for!determining!the!optimal!contract!in!principalQagent!relationships!with!
incomplete!information.!He!notes!that!there!is!existing!literature!regarding!
principalQagent!relationships!with!moral!hazard,!and!in!these!cases,!the!principal!is!
assumed!to!have!full!knowledge!of!the!agent’s!utility!and!what!type!of!agent!he!is.!
However,!the!principal!cannot!directly!observe!the!agent’s!actions!and!therefore!
make!payoffs!based!on!his!actions.!Thus,!a!contract!under!moral!hazard!must!
contain!“payoffs!contingent!on!a!mutually!observable!state!of!nature!so!as!to!induce!
the!agent!to!take!an!action!that!is!in!the!best!interest!of!the!principal”!(Page,!1991,!p.!
323).!The!additional!problem!of!adverse!selection,!or!incomplete!information,!is!one!
that!has!not!been!dealt!with!as!comprehensively!and!arises!from!situations!in!which!
the!principal!does!not!know!the!type!of!agent!he!is!hiring.!In!the!model!devised!by!
Page!(1991),!to!select!the!optimal!contract!for!principalQagent!relationships!with!
moral!hazard!and!adverse!selection,!the!principal!uses!a!probabilistic!mechanism.!In!
the!design!of!this!mechanism,!there!must!be!incentive!for!the!agent!to!sign!the!
contract,!as!well!as!incentive!to!report!his!type!truthfully!(Page,!1991).!
!
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4.3(Strict(Liability(versus(a(Negligence(Rule(in(Cases(with(Moral(Hazard(
Many!economists!deal!with!the!issue!of!strict!liability!versus!a!negligence!
rule!in!the!case!of!moral!hazard.!Viscusi!&!Zeckhauser!(2011),!as!well!as!Cohen!
(1987),!agree!that!strict!liability!is!preferable!to!a!negligence!rule!in!industries!with!
negative!externalities!and!moral!hazard.!Viscusi!&!Zeckhauser!(2011)!discuss!that!
cases!with!a!negligence!rule!require!a!due!care!standard!be!set.!In!the!case!of!an!
accident!occurring,!a!firm!or!individual’s!negligence!must!be!checked!against!this!
standard.!In!industries!with!moral!hazard,!such!as!offshore!drilling,!monitoring!the!
precise!level!of!care!a!firm!or!individual!is!exhibiting!is!nearly!impossible.!Thus,!
holding!an!agent!strictly!liable!for!damages!caused!is!much!more!realistic!and!
efficient!than!trying!to!measure!their!culpability!based!on!a!negligence!rule!and!due!
care!standard!(Viscusi!&!Zeckhauser,!2011).!!
Cohen!(1987)!examines!offshore!oil!operations!close!to!shore!and!monitored!
by!the!United!States!Coast!Guard,!discussing!how!firms!in!this!industry!expend!
resources!to!evade!detection!by!said!monitors.!A!strict!liability!standard!would!
institute!a!severe!penalty!on!any!firm!that!did!not!selfQreport!damages!to!the!
government,!whereas!a!negligence!rule!would!only!penalize!a!firm!if!the!damages!
occurred!due!to!a!lack!of!preventative!care,!which!would!require!third!party!
monitoring!to!assess.!Thus,!Cohen!(1987)!claims!that!a!strict!liability!standard!
provides!a!higher!level!of!net!social!welfare!than!a!negligence!rule!(Cohen,!1987).!In!
a!more!recent!paper,!Cohen!(1998)!furthers!his!argument!for!strict!liability!by!
pointing!out!that!it!is!usually!less!expensive!to!enforce!than!a!negligence!rule!
(Cohen,!1998).!
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Other!economists!provide!arguments!for!how!a!negligence!rule!can!be!made!
efficient!in!industries!with!moral!hazard.!Newman!&!Wright!(1992)!discuss!a!
mechanism!that!allows!a!negligence!liability!system!to!be!implemented,!even!when!
effort!is!not!observable.!In!order!for!this!to!work,!the!contract!between!principal!
and!agent!must!be!designed!to!allow!third!party,!such!as!court,!observability.!
Although!an!agent’s!explicit!actions!are!not!observable,!some!sort!of!results!will!be!
required!that!will!imply!the!agent’s!actions!and!level!of!effort.!A!negligence!rule!
works!by!the!law!setting!a!due!care!standard!that!must!be!met!by!the!agent.!
Newman!&!Wright!(1992)!state!that!as!long!as!effort!is!observable!(in!this!case,!
through!the!contract),!both!strict!liability!and!a!negligence!rule!induce!equal!levels!
of!care!that!minimize!expected!labor!costs!(Newman!&!Wright,!1992).!
Some!economists,!such!as!Segerson!&!Tietenberg!(1992)!go!further!to!claim!
that!a!negligence!rule!can!be!preferable!to!strict!liability!standards.!They!investigate!
using!imprisonment,!as!opposed!to!fines,!as!a!punishment!to!incentivize!workers!to!
exhibit!more!cautious!behavior.!If!efficient!fines!could!always!be!achieved,!fines!
would!be!preferable!to!incarceration!due!to!its!higher!social!and!private!costs.!
However,!in!some!cases,!a!firm’s!or!individual’s!assets!may!not!be!enough!to!cover!
efficient!penalties,!so!adding!the!threat!of!incarceration!makes!up!for!insufficient!
incentives.!When!it!comes!to!imposition!of!criminal!sanctions,!a!negligence!rule!
works!better!than!strict!liability!because!sentences!can!be!shortened!to!lower!social!
and!private!costs!(Segerson!&!Tietenberg,!1992).!
!
!
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4.4(Regulation(in(Industries(with(High(Risk(for(Negative(Externalities(
In!the!literature!about!industries!with!high!risk!for!negative!externalities,!
regulation!as!a!form!of!enforcement!is!debated!among!economists.!Some!assert!that!
regulation!is!absolutely!necessary.!Cohen,!Gottlieb,!Linn,!&!Richardson!(2011)!use!
the!Deepwater(Horizon!incident!as!motivation!for!determining!what!kind!of!
enforcement!mechanisms!could!incentivize!firms!in!the!oil!drilling!industry!to!
promote!a!better!safety!culture.!The!authors!call!for!government!involvement!in!the!
industry!due!to!principalQagent!problems!within!oil!companies!that!might!cause!
them!to!enforce!a!safety!culture!below!the!social!optimum.!In!their!literature!review,!
the!authors!define!safety!culture!as!“the!set!values!promoted!by!the!firm’s!policies!
that!lead!employees!to!prioritize!health,!safety,!and!the!environment”!(Cohen,!
Gottlieb,!Linn,!&!Richardson,!2011,!p.!1858).!They!go!on!to!define!common!
characteristics!of!firms!that!are!highly!reliable!in!terms!of!safety,!as!well!as!firms!
that!have!weak!safety!cultures!(Cohen,!Gottlieb,!Linn,!&!Richardson,!2011).!
Some!economists!call!for!an!increase!in!regulation!among!the!industries!due!
to!certain!circumstances.!For!instance,!Cheung!&!Zhuang!(2012)!design!a!game!to!
compare!governmentQregulated!companies!both!with!and!without!competition,!and!
how!they!comply!with!safety!regulations.!In!the!games!set!up!by!Cheung!&!Zhuang!
(2012),!the!government!and!oil!companies!are!the!players,!behaving!rationally!and!
trying!to!maximize!utility!based!on!risk.!Both!players!need!to!make!decisions!
regarding!allocation!of!resources!towards!regulation!(government)!and!following!
regulation!(oil!companies).!If!the!more!probable!possibility!of!no!oil!spill!occurs,!
both!players!can!save!on!resources!by!ignoring!safety!precautions.!In!the!
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construction!of!the!game,!many!variables!are!accounted!for:!probability!of!
government!enforcement,!company!compliance,!and!spill!occurrence;!cost!to!
company!for!following!regulations,!shutting!down!operations,!and!oil!spills;!cost!to!
government!for!checking!up!on!companies;!revenue!of!company!on!its!own,!
companies!following!regulations,!company!that!does!not!follow!regulations!when!
the!other!does,!company!that!does!follow!regulations!when!the!other!does!not,!and!
companies!that!both!do!not!follow!regulations;!and!expected!losses!and!revenues!
for!both!the!companies!and!government.!Additionally,!the!authors!must!make!
several!important!assumptions!in!order!for!the!game!to!work,!including!the!
assumptions!that!if!regulations!are!followed,!there!is!no!risk!of!a!spill;!that!if!a!
company!follows!regulations,!it!is!more!expensive!than!a!spill!would!be,!
incentivizing!them!to!take!risk;!and!that!the!only!difference!between!companies!in!
the!game!is!their!decision!of!whether!or!not!to!follow!regulations.!Through!
comparing!the!results!of!oneQ!and!twoQcompany!games,!the!authors!conclude!that!
competition!produces!incentive!for!companies!to!avoid!safety!measures,!because!
with!more!competition,!a!company’s!risk!threshold!increases.!Due!to!these!results,!
the!authors!believe!that!with!more!competition,!more!strict!regulation!becomes!
necessary.!In!their!conclusion,!they!note!that!competition!usually!helps!a!market!by!
reducing!prices!for!consumers,!pushing!forward!innovation,!and!more.!However,!
with!the!deregulation!of!industries!that!carry!high!risks,!such!as!airlines!and!electric!
utilities,!there!has!been!an!increased!prioritization!of!maximizing!profit!over!
practicing!safe!procedures!(Cheung!&!Zhuang,!2012).!
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Arguments!are!made!for!decreasing!regulation!as!well.!Miller!&!Whitford!
(2007)!discuss!the!issue!of!selfQinterest!and!its!role!in!incentivizing!effort!level!and!
behavior.!In!principalQagent!relationships,!the!principal!often!turns!to!coercion!or!
rulemaking!to!get!his!agents!to!behave!as!he!wants!them!to,!despite!the!fact!that!this!
may!not!lead!to!the!most!efficient!outcomes.!In!the!same!thread!as!the!Invisible!
Hand!that!guides!the!market,!the!authors!of!this!paper!hope!that!individuals!
following!selfQinterests!will!drive!efficient!allocation!in!principalQagent!
relationships.!Because!both!principals!and!agents!are!individuals!motivated!
ultimately!by!their!own!selfQinterests,!the!authors!believe!that!with!the!right!set!of!
incentives,!coercion!and!monitoring!of!agent!behavior!will!no!longer!be!necessary!
(Miller!&!Whitford,!2007).!
!
4.5(The(Role(of(Monitoring(
Within!the!discussion!of!optimal!enforcement!strategies!for!this!industry!
comes!the!question!of!monitoring!and!to!what!extent!it!can!be!efficient.!Miller!&!
Whitford!(2007)!and!Cohen!(1987)!agree!that!some!extent!of!monitoring!is!
necessary!due!to!moral!hazard!in!the!industry.!Although!Miller!&!Whitford!(2007)!
promote!the!idea!of!selfQinterest!driving!firm!and!individual!incentives!towards!
efficient!allocation!in!their!principalQagent!relationship,!they!concede!that!due!to!
riskQaversion!and!asymmetrical!information,!it!can!be!very!difficult!to!avoid!
monitoring!entirely.!If!the!principal!takes!on!the!risk,!the!agent!has!incentive!to!put!
forth!less!effort.!However,!it!is!inefficient!to!put!all!the!risk!on!the!agent.!It!seems!
that!in!situations!where!monitoring!is!cheap!and!easy,!the!principal!will!choose!to!
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bear!the!risk,!but!otherwise!will!shift!some!or!all!of!it!to!the!agent!(Miller!&!
Whitford,!2007).!Cohen!(1987)!points!out!that!in!cases!like!oil!spills,!agent!activity!
must!be!monitored!because!spills!can!occur!due!to!outside!forces!that!are!not!the!
fault!of!the!agent.!However,!in!the!model!he!presents,!he!concludes!that!with!an!
increase!in!penalties,!monitoring!can!be!decreased!(Cohen,!1987).!
Rather!than!simply!accepting!that!some!amount!of!monitoring!is!unavoidable!
in!industries!with!moral!hazard,!some!economists!believe!that!despite!its!costs,!
monitoring!is!an!essential!tool!in!the!promotion!of!safety!culture!among!firms.!In!his!
more!recent!paper,!Cohen!(1998)!reviews!some!theories!as!to!the!best!strategies!for!
monitoring!and!enforcement.!He!states!that!firms!respond!to!the!probability!of!
detection!plus!the!level!of!punishment!they!receive!if!caught.!This!means!that!
increasing!monitoring!and/or!raising!penalties!for!noncompliance!might!help!
promote!rule!following.!According!to!one!model,!the!lower!the!probability!of!
detection!is,!the!higher!the!penalty!will!be,!and!vice!versa.!Monitoring!can!be!costly,!
so!incentivizing!selfQreporting!is!suggested!as!a!way!to!reduce!these!costs.!This!
could!include!a!higher!penalty!for!firms!that!fail!to!report!pollution!or!misreport!
information.!Although!studies!show!this!often!decreases!monitoring!costs,!it!also!
leads!to!more!sanctions,!which!can!be!costly!to!impose!and!collect!(Cohen,!1998).!
Grau!&!Groves!(1997)!construct!a!model!by!which!to!determine!the!effect!
that!monitoring!and!fines!can!have!on!spill!frequency!and!size.!The!Coast!Guard!is!
responsible!for!enforcing!the!law!that!there!can!be!no!oil!spills!within!12!nautical!
miles!of!the!U.S.!coastline.!The!spills!the!Coast!Guard!monitors!are!of!a!much!smaller!
scale!than!spills!that!occur!in!deepwater!drilling.!After!making!their!assumptions,!
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the!authors!conclude!that!increased!probability!of!Coast!Guard!monitoring!
decreases!oil!spill!frequency!and!size,!while!fines!have!no!effect.!This!may!be!
because!the!fines!for!these!kind!of!spills!are!so!small,!and!therefore!do!not!provide!
enough!incentive.!However,!monitoring!is!proven!to!be!an!effective!mechanism!for!
incentivizing!firm!compliance!with!safety!regulations!(Grau!&!Groves,!1997).!
!
4.6(Enforcement(Strategies(
When!it!comes!to!enforcement!strategies!in!industries!with!high!risk!for!
negative!environmental!externalities,!most!economists!agree!that!multiQlayered!
enforcement!is!needed.!Viscusi!&!Zeckhauser!(2011)!use!the!Deepwater(Horizon!oil!
spill!as!an!impetus!for!devising!a!new!system!of!liability!for!firms!engaging!in!
activities!with!a!risk!for!environmental!damages.!Through!a!twoQtier!strict!liability!
scheme,!a!balance!is!created!between!the!risks!firms!in!these!industries!bear!and!the!
costs!of!the!damages!that!could!be!potentially!incurred!in!extreme!circumstances.!A!
crucial!component!of!the!authors’!strategy!is!holding!one!firm!liable!from!the!start!
and!therefore!taking!on!full!responsibility!for!compensation!of!damages.!It!is!noted!
that!this!firm!can!still!contract!out!to!other!firms,!serving!as!their!principal,!but!the!
individual!contracts!created!will!have!to!specify!what!said!firms!are!responsible!for!
should!there!be!an!incident.!This!puts!incentives!in!the!hands!of!one!principal!
company!that!has!the!most!knowledge!and!control!over!the!outcome!of!the!
activities.!Because!said!principal!will!be!held!ultimately!responsible!for!any!incident!
that!occurs,!it!will!have!incentive!to!promote!riskQaverse!behavior!among!its!agents!
(both!employees!and!other!contracted!firms).!The!first!tier!of!the!liability!scheme!
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consists!of!a!financial!resource!requirement—the!firm!must!be!capable!of!affording!
to!cover!the!potential!damages!it!could!cause.!The!second!tier!helps!allow!for!smallQ!
and!mediumQsized!companies!to!remain!competitors!in!these!risky!industries!by!
imposing!an!annual!tax!equal!to!the!expected!costs!beyond!damages!amount.!For!
example,!if!total!damages!would!potentially!be!$50!billion!and!a!firm!can!afford!to!
cover!$20!billion!with!its!financial!assets,!it!will!be!required!to!pay!$30!billion!in!
taxes!over!the!year.!Because!BP!put!$20!billion!into!a!reparations!fund!following!the!
Deepwater(Horizon!incident,!the!authors!suggest!this!as!the!financial!resource!
requirement!for!a!firm!drilling!in!the!Gulf!of!Mexico.!With!traditional!liability!
structures,!smaller!firms!often!recognize!that!the!losses!from!an!oil!spill!may!be!so!
extensive!that!they!would!never!be!able!to!pay!for!them,!causing!them!to!act!more!
recklessly.!However,!with!the!twoQtier!liability!system,!firms!will!have!incentive!to!
take!the!socially!optimal!and!more!cautious!path!(Viscusi!&!Zeckhauser,!2011).!
Incentive!systems!such!as!these!are!equally!if!not!more!important!than!regulation,!
because!government!salaries!will!not!be!enough!to!attract!the!most!experienced!and!
competent!people!to!regulator!jobs.!
In!a!similar,!yet!slightly!more!complex!strategy!featuring!thirdQparty!
insurance!in!place!of!a!tax,!Cohen,!Gottlieb,!Linn,!&!Richardson!(2011)!also!devise!a!
multiQlayered!enforcement!scheme.!Following!a!study!of!different!enforcement!
mechanisms!that!could!potentially!be!used,!the!authors!make!their!recommendation!
as!to!which!set!of!these!policies!seems!it!will!most!effectively!promote!a!safety!
culture!in!the!industry.!First,!they!believe!that!the!liability!cap!should!be!raised!and!
set!on!a!wellQbyQwell!basis.!This!means!firms!will!be!liable!for!damages!of!the!worstQ
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case!scenario!projected!for!their!specific!well!and!its!conditions.!Second,!third!party!
insurance!will!be!required!to!cover!all!costs!up!to!the!liability!cap,!as!well!as!
potentially!more!than!this.!This!allows!for!smaller!firms!to!afford!drilling!riskier!
wells.!Third!party!insurance!will!also!provide!a!monitoring!mechanism!with!greater!
incentive!to!assess!a!company’s!actions!than!the!government!as!a!monitor!has,!
because!the!insurance!company!will!be!liable!in!the!case!of!a!spill.!With!insurance!
comes!a!problem!with!moral!hazard,!and!riskQbased!fees!should!be!used!to!assuage!
this.!RiskQbased!fees!would!require!firms!to!pay!based!on!a!thirdQparty!rating!of!the!
safety!of!the!well!they!are!working!on.!In!cases!where!insurance!coverage!is!
impossible!for!the!level!of!the!liability!cap,!demonstration!of!financial!responsibility!
will!be!required.!Thus,!a!firm!will!show!they!are!able!to!cover!the!cost!of!damages!
themselves,!without!insurance!(Cohen,!Gottlieb,!Linn,!&!Richardson,!2011).!
Miller!&!Whitford!(2007)!support!the!strategy!of!incentives!that!will!promote!
selfQinterested!behavior!to!align!with!efficient!allocation!in!principalQagent!
relationships.!A!pure!incentive!contract!is!one!in!which!agents!are!offered!
compensation,!and!a!commonly!effective!version!includes!a!flat!wage.!This!provides!
the!agent!with!enough!incentive!to!accept!the!contract!and!exert!some!level!of!effort,!
plus!a!bonus!when!high!levels!of!effort!are!displayed.!This!kind!of!contract!works!
well!with!selfQinterested!agents.!However,!the!economists!introduce!‘the!principal’s!
moral!hazard!constraint’,!because!“bonuses!large!enough!to!produce!the!efficient!
incentive!effect!are!prohibitively!expensive!for!the!principal”!(Miller!&!Whitford,!
2007,!p.!213).!Because!the!selfQinterested!principal!is!often!a!firm!driven!by!profitQ
maximization,!and!a!certain!level!of!bonuses!would!cut!into!said!profit,!the!principal!
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often!chooses!the!less!efficient!method!of!monitoring!or!incentivizing!their!agents!to!
perform.!In!the!model!proposed!by!the!authors,!the!agent’s!efficacy!plays!a!large!
role.!Efficacy!is!defined!as!the!agent’s!ability!to!affect!the!outcome!of!his!efforts—the!
less!able!he!is!to!better!or!worsen!the!final!product,!the!more!incentive!he!will!need!
to!work!harder.!Additionally,!if!the!cost!to!the!agent!of!high!effort!is!much!greater!
than!the!cost!of!low!effort,!he!will!need!more!incentive!to!exert!the!extra!effort.!
Lower!efficacy!and/or!high!cost!of!high!effort!levels!will!lower!the!chances!that!
incentives!will!be!a!profitable!choice!for!the!principal,!even!if!they!are!efficient.!As!
level!of!efficacy!grows,!the!bonus!a!principal!needs!to!offer!diminishes,!and!thus!
profits!are!higher.!Thus,!the!greater!the!effect!the!agent!has!on!the!outcome!of!his!
work,!the!more!likely!a!pure!incentive,!bonusQbased!contract!will!be!profitable!to!
the!principal!(Miller!&!Whitford,!2007).!
!
4.7(Employer(versus(Employee(Responsibility(
A!common!discussion!in!the!literature!is!that!of!employer!versus!employee!
responsibility!and!punishment.!Cohen!(1998)!tackles!the!issue!of!employer!versus!
employee!responsibility.!If!the!employee!commits!a!violation!on!the!behalf!of!the!
firm,!then!who!is!responsible!for!taking!the!punishment?!No!matter!whom!the!law!
deems!responsible,!the!employer!can!pass!on!the!costs!to!the!employee!through!
their!contract.!However,!sometimes!the!employee!will!be!simply!unable!to!afford!the!
sanction,!in!which!case!the!employer!would!have!the!incentive!to!promote!more!
cautious!behavior,!as!they!will!have!to!cover!the!fine.!Another!way!to!handle!this!
question!of!responsibility!is!to!have!some!employees!liable!for!environmental!
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damages!and!on!a!fixed!wage!contract,!while!employees!responsible!for!increasing!
profits!are!on!separate!incentive!contracts!(Cohen!1998).!
Although!economists!like!Cohen!(1998)!question!the!effectiveness!of!placing!
risk!and!punishment!on!the!employee,!economists!such!as!Polinsky!&!Shavell!
(1993)!promote!the!idea!of!employee!punishment!as!a!way!to!incentivize!a!safer!
work!culture.!They!use!the!economic!theory!of!deterrence!to!determine!if!it!is!
socially!desirable!to!punish!employees!when!there!is!already!corporate!liability.!A!
benefit!of!publicly!imposed!sanctions!is!that!they!can!often!be!greater!than!what!the!
firm!could!have!imposed!on!its!employees.!For!example,!if!a!firm!were!to!withhold!
wages!in!the!case!of!an!employee!causing!harm,!this!might!not!be!enough!to!
incentivize!him!to!be!careful.!With!state!involvement,!employees!will!have!more!
incentive!to!exhibit!the!socially!optimal!level!of!care.!Additionally,!the!state!can!
threaten!criminal!charges!and/or!imprisonment!on!an!employee!that!does!not!pay!
their!fines—a!company!is!not!able!to!do!this.!With!these!more!dramatic!incentives,!
employees!will!exhibit!more!care,!decreasing!the!amount!of!expected!harm!and!
therefore!costs!of!the!firm.!In!order!to!make!this!socially!optimal,!firm!liability!must!
be!lowered,!making!firm!liability!plus!the!fine!imposed!on!the!employee(s)!equal!to!
the!expected!level!of!harm.!If!not,!prices!will!be!driven!up!higher!than!the!socially!
optimal!price!to!cover!firm!liability.!The!socially!optimal!outcome!is!equal!to!the!
level!of!care!and!output!that!maximize!social!welfare.!Social!welfare!is!determined!
by!the!utility!a!consumer!gets!from!output,!minus!disutility!of!work!to!the!employee,!
cost!of!taking!care,!and!expected!harm.!In!the!conclusion,!the!authors!mention!
several!other!ideas!about!how!to!incentivize!the!socially!optimal!level!of!care!from!
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employees.!One!such!idea!is!an!efficiency!wage,!which!means!making!wages!
excessively!high!to!attract!workers.!However,!if!they!cause!harm!and!their!wages!
are!withheld!there!will!also!be!more!for!them!to!lose.!An!idea!the!authors!strike!as!
ineffective!is!that!of!imposing!punitive!damages!and!criminal!fines!on!the!
corporation,!because!this!will!not!change!the!firm’s!ability!to!incentivize!its!
employees!to!take!more!care!(Polinsky!&!Shavell,!1993).!!
!
4.8(The(Government(as(an(Enforcer(
The!issue!of!the!government!as!an!enforcer!is!touched!upon!in!the!literature.!
Cohen!(1998)!points!out!that!the!government’s!goals!might!not!always!align!with!
maximizing!social!welfare.!Additionally,!the!government!will!fail!to!enforce!policies!
strictly!if!compliance!costs!are!too!high!for!the!firm!to!cover!on!its!own.!This!often!
happens!in!cases!where!a!firm!has!a!lot!of!local!employees!that!will!lose!their!jobs!if!
the!firm!shuts!down.!Some!employees!of!enforcement!agencies!can!further!their!
careers!by!enforcing!more!strictly,!giving!them!incentive!for!more!strict!
enforcement!(Cohen,!1998).!
!
4.9(Summary(of(Findings(
In!the!literature!surrounding!industries!with!high!risk!for!negative!
externalities,!there!are!several!common!themes!that!economists!examine!and!try!to!
resolve.!In!doing!so,!they!must!make!assumptions!and!generalizations!about!the!
industries!and!firms!in!them!in!order!to!draw!any!kind!of!conclusions.!Most!
economists!promote!a!strict!liability!standard!over!a!negligence!rule,!due!to!the!
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difficulty!of!measuring!level!of!care!in!industries!with!moral!hazard.!The!economists!
that!provide!scenarios!where!a!negligence!rule!works!as!well!as!a!strict!liability!
standard!have!to!make!special!accommodations!for!this.!When!discussing!moral!
hazard,!there!is!a!consensus!that!monitoring!is!essential.!However,!the!levels!of!
monitoring!recommended!vary!between!economists,!with!some!attempting!to!
decrease!the!level!as!much!as!possible.!In!terms!of!regulation,!the!economists!all!
agree!that!some!degree!of!outside!enforcement!is!necessary!due!to!principalQagent!
problems!within!industries!with!negative!externalities.!Some!economists!believe!
regulation!should!be!increased,!while!others!believe!agents!can!be!incentivized!in!
ways!that!will!allow!for!regulation!to!be!drastically!decreased.!Those!that!argue!for!
less!regulation!see!regulation!as!inefficient,!since!it!often!comes!from!an!ineffective!
or!uninformed!source,!such!as!the!government.!For!an!enforcement!strategy!in!this!
industry,!all!the!literature!points!to!schemes!with!multiQlayered!enforcement.!The!
economists!account!for!the!fact!that!holding!firms!liable!for!damages!may!push!
small!companies!out!of!the!industry.!Many!proposals!are!made!to!hold!firms!
accountable!for!damages!despite!their!lack!of!resources,!and!at!the!same!time,!
disallow!them!from!taking!larger!risks!and!simply!declaring!bankruptcy!if!
something!goes!wrong.!Literature!from!after!the!Deepwater(Horizon!disaster!notes!
that!the!amount!of!damages!firms!are!held!liable!for!needs!to!be!increased.!Some!
economists!support!the!idea!of!imposing!criminal!sanctions!on!employees!
responsible!for!damages,!because!this!provides!more!incentive!than!the!firm!could!
have!provided!on!its!own.!However,!Cohen!(1998)!points!out!that!even!if!employees!
are!held!liable!for!their!mistakes,!the!firm!will!still!suffer!consequences!from!
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damages!done.!Finally,!economists!agree!that!the!government!as!an!enforcer!might!
not!be!the!socially!optimal!option.!Incentives!are!needed!for!the!government!to!
enforce!at!the!socially!optimal!level,!since!government!employees!can!sometimes!
profit!from!the!risky!behavior!of!firms!that!provide!the!U.S.!Treasury!with!royalties.!
Additionally,!government!salaries!are!not!always!enough!to!attract!the!most!
qualified!candidates!for!carrying!out!enforcement!policies.!
!
!

!

!
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Chapter(V(
Application(of(the(Model2(
(
With(the(necessary(background(information(gathered,(it(is(possible(to(synthesize(
potential(mechanisms(to(compose(an(optimal(enforcement(strategy(for(industries(with(
a(high(risk(for(negative(externalities.(Section(5.1(of(this(Chapter(identifies(agency(
problems(and(questions(that(arise(in(the(examination(of(said(problems.(After(
ascertaining(these(unresolved(issues,(Section(5.2(proposes(potential(solutions.(

(
5.1(Identifying(Agency(Problems(
!

In!the!investigations!and!literature!surrounding!the!Deepwater(Horizon(

disaster,!there!is!much!analysis!of!the!technical!and!mechanical!failures!that!led!to!
the!blowout!of!the!Macondo!well.!Although!these!events!were!the!direct!causes!of!
the!oil!spill,!behind!each!event!were!firms!and!employees!making!decisions!that!
allowed!them!to!occur.!A!series!of!principalQagent!relationships!with!inefficient!
incentive!schemes!existed,!both!among!and!within!the!involved!agencies,!which!
provoked!the!improper!decisions!that!led!to!the!blowout.!
!
!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2!As!some!of!the!more!industryQspecific!technical!terms!reappear!in!this!Chapter,!the!reader!is!
reminded!to!refer!to!the!Glossary,!Section!2.12!at!the!end!of!Chapter!II.!
!
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5.1.1(What(kinds(of(incentives(can(the(government(have(to(choose(to(promote(
safety(rather(than(place(emphasis(on(making(a(profit?(
According!to!the!Constitution’s!Property!Clause,!the!United!States!
government!is!given!ownership!of!offshore!natural!resources.!Thus,!management!
and!protection!of!the!Outer!Continental!Shelf!where!these!resources!exist!is!the!
responsibility!of!the!government.!Due!to!the!potential!profits!from!drilling!in!everQ
deeper!waters,!the!government!has!promoted!policies!to!accelerate!offshore!
exploration!and!development!faster!than!technology!and!legislation!can!keep!up,!
while!enforcement!of!industry!regulations!has!fallen!by!the!wayside!(National!
Commission,!2011).!
In!order!to!exercise!the!government’s!duties,!the!Secretary!of!the!Interior!
created!the!Minerals!Management!Service!(MMS)!in!1982.!MMS!was!charged!with!
regulation!of!offshore!drilling!sites,!through!both!leasing!areas!to!be!drilled!and!
enforcing!safety!standards!set!to!protect!the!environment!and!local!residents!from!
these!potentially!hazardous!activities!(National!Commission,!2011).!Herein!lies!the!
first!problem!with!incentives.!Royalties!from!lease!sales!made!by!MMS!went!straight!
into!the!United!States!Treasury,!providing!the!agency!with!incentive!to!lease!as!
many!areas!as!possible,!perhaps!without!proper!safety!evaluations!of!the!sites!or!the!
permits!submitted!by!drilling!companies.!The!government!is!responsible!for!
promoting!socially!optimal!outcomes,!however!its!interests!will!not!always!align!
with!these!outcomes,!especially!when!it!stands!to!make!a!profit.!!
!

!
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5.1.2(What(incentives(can(be(given(for(experts(on(the(technicalities(and(safety(
concerns(of(industries(with(high(risk(for(negative(externalities,(like(offshore(
drilling,(to(want(to(work(as(enforcers(and(monitors(in(such(industries?!
Directors!at!MMS!were!hired!with!more!emphasis!on!the!role!of!leasing!than!
on!their!expertise!regarding!the!drilling!industry,!repeatedly!acknowledging!
spending!more!time!on!royalty!issues!than!oversight!responsibilities.!At!the!same!
time,!due!to!midrange!government!salaries,!experts!in!the!field!were!not!attracted!to!
the!agency.!Although!MMS!had!“hundreds!of!pages!of!technical!requirements!for!
pollution!prevention!and!control,!drilling,!wellQcompletion!operations,!oil!and!gas!
wellQworkovers!(major!well!maintenance),!production!safety!systems,!platforms!
and!structures,!pipelines,!well!production,!and!wellQcontrol!and!Qproduction!safety!
training”!(National!Commission,!2011,!p.!84),!the!enforcement!of!these!
requirements!was!ineffective.!Unscheduled!inspections!of!offshore!oil!operations!
only!covered!a!subset!of!the!regulations,!and!were!conducted!by!inspectors!who!did!
not!need!to!complete!any!kind!of!certification!program!for!their!job.!Inspector!
responsibilities!were!not!included!in!any!sort!of!MMS!handbook!or!guidelines!
(National!Commission,!2011).!
(
5.13(What(incentives(can(be(given(to(companies,(as(agents,(within(industries(
with(high(risk(for(negative(externalities,(such(as(the(drilling(industry,(to(make(
them(act(more(cautiously?(
!

When!international!oil!and!gas!company!BP!was!granted!a!leased!area!to!drill!

in!the!Mississippi!Canyon!of!the!Gulf!of!Mexico!in!March!2008,!the!firm!became!an!

!
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agent!to!MMS.!As!the!principal,!MMS!was!in!charge!of!reviewing!all!permits!and!
requests!from!BP!regarding!exploration!and!drilling!of!the!lease!block.!The!MMS!
personnel!responsible!for!assessing!and!approving!these!applications!did!not!have!
any!guidelines!or!requirements!for!evaluation!of!aspects!critical!for!well!safety,!and!
with!the!agency’s!lack!of!internal!expertise,!probably!would!not!have!been!able!to!
effectively!interpret!this!information!anyway.!No!other!agency!performed!any!kind!
of!inspection!or!required!any!disclosure!of!information!regarding!the!lease!block!in!
terms!of!environmental!laws!and!mandates!outside!MMS!regulations!(National!
Commission,!2011).!
As!an!example!of!the!internal!inefficiencies!of!MMS,!consider!BP’s!Oil!Spill!
Response!Plan,!created!to!comply!with!the!Oil!Pollution!Act!of!1990,!and!approved!
by!MMS.!This!plan!suffered!from!an!astounding!lack!of!attention!to!detail,!including!
text!copied!directly!from!the!National!Oceanic!and!Atmospheric!Administration’s!
website,!which!mentioned!sea!life!inexistent!in!the!Gulf.!MMS!did!not!further!
analyze!any!part!of!the!plan.!The!failure!of!MMS!to!provide!stringent!enforcement!of!
its!policies!was!highlighted!by!the!fact!that!the!final!plan!for!temporary!
abandonment!of!the!well!used!by!BP!was!not!the!plan!MMS!saw!or!approved,!and!
included!unusual!methods!outside!MMS!regulations!(National!Commission,!2011).!
!

Although!most!associations!between!a!controlling!entity!and!its!subsidiaries!

can!be!categorized!as!principalQagent!relationships,!the!nature!of!these!contracts!
and!incentive!schemes!does!not!always!cause!problems.!However,!problems!did!
arise!between!the!principal,!MMS,!and!its!agent,!BP,!due!to!improper!incentives!and!
moral!hazard.!!As!previously!explained,!the!lack!of!incentive!for!MMS!to!effectively!
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enforce!safety!regulations!on!BP!was!due!to!the!conflict!of!MMS’!interest!in!
collecting!royalties!for!the!government.!Further!lack!of!incentive!lay!with!BP,!
because!due!to!MMS’!lack!of!expertise!and!attention!to!detail,!the!firm!did!not!face!
any!consequences!for!lack!of!thoroughness!or!questionable!decisions!in!their!permit!
applications.!Additionally,!due!to!the!absence!of!strict!inspections!or!checkQins!from!
MMS,!BP!had!less!incentive!to!follow!safety!protocol!carefully.!For!example,!
Deepwater(Horizon(had!been!in!BP’s!service!for!almost!a!decade.!In!a!September!
2009!safety!audit!by!BP,!390!items!on!the!rig!were!found!to!require!more!than!3500!
hours!of!work!to!meet!safety!standards.!Clearly,!the!rig!was!behind!on!maintenance!
and!testing,!but!it!was!selected!to!drill!the!Macondo!well!regardless,!and!MMS!did!
not!express!any!kind!of!concern!or!opposition!(National!Commission,!2011).!
As!owner!of!Deepwater(Horizon,!Transocean!was!indirectly!an!agent!to!MMS!
as!well,!with!responsibility!for!keeping!its!rig!up!to!safety!standards.!Interestingly,!
in!Transocean’s!investigation!(2011)!of!the!Deepwater(Horizon!disaster,!several!
inspections!of!the!rig!by!MMS!are!mentioned.!According!to!Transocean,!none!of!
these!tests!ever!indicated!any!action!be!taken!by!the!rig!crew!(Transocean,!2011).!
MMS!had!either!been!allowing!the!rig!to!pass!inspections!too!easily!or!failing!to!
followQup!on!inspections!and!make!sure!changes!were!made,!explaining!
Transocean’s!lack!of!incentive!to!keep!upQtoQdate!on!maintenance!and!testing.!!
(
(

!
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5.1.4(What(kind(of(contract(can(be(designed(to(incentivize(safety(interests(
within(involved(companies((operators(and(subcontractors),(given(the(moral(
hazard(existent(in(these(industries?(
!

Moral!hazard!added!problems!to!the!principalQagent!relationship!between!

MMS!and!BP!due!to!the!very!nature!of!the!industry.!Without!an!inspector!on!board!
at!all!times,!MMS!was!never!able!to!fully!monitor!BP’s!operations!out!in!the!middle!
of!the!ocean.!This!kind!of!monitoring!would!have!been!costly,!inefficient,!and!
unrealistic.!Once!BP!was!granted!the!lease!and!approved!for!drilling,!only!those!
directly!involved!in!drilling!operations!knew!exactly!how!cautious!they!were!being,!
as!much!can!be!distorted!for!the!sake!of!getting!plans!approved!or!passing!safety!
inspections.!Thus,!the!contract!between!MMS!and!BP!needed!to!be!more!carefully!
designed!to!provide!BP!with!incentive!to!follow!safety!regulations,!without!the!need!
for!constant!monitoring!from!MMS.!!
(
5.1.5(What(kind(of(contract(can(an(operator,(like(BP,(draw(up(with(its(
contracted(subsidiaries(to(hold(them(more(accountable(for(performing(their(
duties(with(due(care?(
The!relationships!between!MMS!as!an!enforcer!and!BP!and!Transocean!were!
not!the!only!ones!with!principalQagent!problems!involved!in!the!Macondo!well!
blowout.!BP!contracted!work!to!several!different!companies!throughout!the!course!
of!drilling!operations,!becoming!the!principal!to!those!subcontractors!as!agents.!
First,!BP!contracted!Transocean!for!the!use!of!their!rig,!Deepwater(Horizon,!and!its!
crew.!During!drilling,!most!men!on!board!the!rig!were!from!Transocean,!and!as!
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agents!they!did!not!have!enough!incentive!to!exercise!caution,!since!BP!was!the!
name!on!the!project!and!operator!of!the!lease!site.!As!a!principal,!BP!failed!to!
incentivize!its!agent,!Transocean!to!make!the!best!decisions!regarding!safety,!or!to!
hold!them!liable!for!failing!to!do!so.!In!its!investigation!of!the!blowout,!Transocean!
stated!that!BP!had!responsibilities!as!the!operator,!including!oversight!of!all!
decisions!made!and!work!done!on!the!well.!Clearly,!Transocean’s!contract!did!not!
give!the!company!incentive!to!take!on!the!burden!of!any!of!these!things!itself.!For!
example,!a!well!control!event!occurred!on!March!8th!that!Transocean’s!team!did!not!
respond!to!in!a!timely!manner.!Despite!this!criticism,!no!changes!were!made!to!
prevent!a!similar!event!from!happening!again.!BP!did!not!require!Transocean!to!
make!these!changes,!nor!properly!incentivize!them!to!choose!to!make!changes!on!
their!own!(National!Commission,!2011).!
Another!example!of!Transocean!failing!to!exercise!proper!caution!due!to!lack!
of!incentives!from!BP!was!when!interpreting!the!negative!pressure!test!during!
temporary!abandonment!of!the!well.!An!experienced!Transocean!crewmember!
essentially!invented!an!effect!to!explain!the!anomalous!readings!from!the!test.!
Because!BP!failed!to!provide!any!guidelines!for!success/failure!criteria!of!this!
critical!test,!the!crewmember’s!superiors!accepted!the!explanation!without!much!
question.!Additionally,!there!were!no!requirements!for!this!kind!of!unusual!
information!to!be!sent!back!to!shore!for!more!expert!analysis!or!approval,!giving!
Transocean!crewmembers!little!incentive!to!thoroughly!consider!their!conclusions!
(National!Commission,!2011).!Less!moral!hazard!existed!in!this!relationship,!due!to!
the!presence!of!BP!employees!on!board!the!rig!during!drilling!operations.!
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!

Another!important!company!BP!acted!as!principal!to!was!Halliburton,!the!

agent!contracted!to!design!the!cement!used!to!seal!the!well,!as!well!as!install!it.!
Throughout!the!design!process,!Halliburton!failed!to!report!cement!test!results!to!
BP!on!multiple!occasions.!However,!BP!did!not!provide!them!with!the!incentive!to!
do!so,!nor!ask!for!the!results!when!they!were!not!provided!(National!Commission,!
2011).!Halliburton!lacked!incentive!to!both!conduct!all!necessary!tests!and!to!report!
results!of!tests!that!were!conducted,!since!BP!did!not!keep!tabs!on!or!request!either.!
Because!the!cement!slurry!being!designed!was!unusual,!BP!had!even!greater!
responsibility!to!check!up!on!Halliburton,!but!still!failed!to!do!so!(BP,!2010).!!
(
5.1.6(How(can(operating(companies,(such(as(BP,(alter(contracts(with(their(
employees(to(incentivize(them(to(promote(a(safety(culture(while(on(the(job?(
Yet!another!set!of!principalQagent!problems!existed!within!the!companies!
involved!in!the!Deepwater(Horizon!disaster.!There!is!evidence!that!BP!employees!did!
not!have!the!proper!incentives!from!corporate!BP!as!their!principal!to!promote!a!
safety!culture!on!board!the!rig.!To!the!contrary,!many!decisions!that!were!made!in!
the!events!leading!up!to!the!blowout!imply!the!promotion!of!a!timeQ!and!moneyQ
saving!culture,!which!is!in!opposition!of!a!cautious!one.!For!example,!during!well!
abandonment,!there!was!an!issue!with!the!number!of!centralizers!available!versus!
how!many!the!plans!called!for.!After!much!deliberation!and!miscommunication!
between!BP!team!members!about!replacing!the!missing!centralizers!with!
questionably!substandard!centralizers,!only!six!centralizers!were!used—ten!less!
than!the!plan!called!for.!Although!the!BP!Drilling!Engineering!Team!Leader!and!a!BP!
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senior!manager!felt!the!differently!designed!centralizers!should!have!been!used!to!
honor!the!abandonment!plan’s!requirements,!the!BP!Well!Team!Leader!on!board!the!
rig!stated!their!unconventional!design!would!take!too!much!time!to!install,!and!
made!the!decision!not!to!use!them.!His!superiors!did!not!contest!his!decision,!
implying!this!kind!of!timesavingQoverQcaution!environment!was!approved!of!
(National!Commission,!2011).!!
Another!example!of!timesaving!behavior!happened!during!a!crucial!step!of!
the!abandonment!process:!conversion!of!the!float!collars.!Due!to!time!constraints,!
when!less!flow!was!observed!during!conversion!than!anticipated,!BP’s!team!
concluded!that!the!pressure!gauge!was!broken.!Conversion!was!deemed!successful,!
with!no!additional!explanation!or!investigation!(National!Commission,!2011).!
!

BP!made!several!questionable!decisions!regarding!cementing!of!the!well,!the!

failure!of!which!is!cited!by!all!three!investigations!as!one!of!the!major!causes!of!the!
blowout.!A!light!nitrogen!slurry!cement!design!was!chosen!to!reduce!chances!of!
cracking!the!delicate!rock!formation!at!the!base!of!the!well,!but!despite!the!unusual!
design,!no!extra!care!was!taken!to!ensure!its!quality.!In!fact,!BP!experts!were!never!
given!the!opportunity!to!perform!quality!assurance!tests!on!the!cement!before!it!
was!used,!probably!in!the!interest!of!saving!time.!The!BP!zonal!isolation!experts!that!
would!have!performed!the!tests!did!not!demand!an!opportunity!to!do!so!(National!
Commission,!2011)!and!thus!lacked!incentive!to!take!care!in!their!responsibilities.!
!

After!the!primary!cement!job!was!pumped,!lost!returns!were!the!only!criteria!

for!its!success.!When!no!flowQback!was!observed,!BP!crewmembers!determined!the!
cement!job!was!a!success.!Schlumberger!technicians!were!on!board!to!conduct!a!
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cement!evaluation!test,!but!because!this!single!criterion!had!been!met,!they!were!
sent!home.!Rather!than!exercise!caution!by!doubleQchecking!cement!stability!with!a!
third!party!team!of!experts,!BP!crewmembers!made!the!decision!to!save!time!and!
$128,000!(National!Commission,!2011).!
!

Evidence!of!BP’s!costQsaving!culture!is!further!evidenced!by!their!decision!to!

use!unusual!spacer!fluid!during!the!critical!negative!pressure!test.!The!fluid!used!
was!made!out!of!two!different!lostQcirculation!materials!left!over!from!previous!well!
operations,!which!would!have!needed!to!be!disposed!of!in!a!prescribed!way!onshore!
had!it!not!been!used!in!this!way.!Although!the!spacer!was!of!unique!composition,!it!
was!never!thoroughly!tested!for!its!purpose!(National!Commission,!2011).!Clearly,!
the!BP!employees!on!board!Deepwater(Horizon!did!not!have!the!right!incentives!
from!corporate!BP!to!be!exercising!caution!in!their!decisionQmaking.!Even!if!
regulations!were!in!place!to!encourage!avoidance!of!timeQ!or!costQsaving!behaviors!
without!careful!consideration,!these!regulations!were!not!enforced!through!
incentives!such!as!oversight.!!
(
5.1.7(How(can(subcontracted(companies,(such(as(Transocean,(also(alter(
contracts(with(their(employees(to(incentivize(them(to(promote(a(safety(culture(
while(on(the(job?(
Transocean!employees!also!made!decisions!that!exhibited!a!lack!of!
consideration!for!caution!and!safety!concerns!and!implied!principalQagent!problems!
within!the!company.!For!example,!the!Transocean!Well!Control!Handbook!
stipulated!that!wells!should!be!monitored!at!all!times,!but!did!not!explain!how!this!
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should!be!done!in!special!circumstances.!Despite!this!stipulation,!drillers!and!
mudloggers,!who!were!responsible!for!well!monitoring,!were!not!monitoring!the!
well!at!all!times!during!the!events!that!occurred!on!April!20,!2010.!Before!the!
blowout!occurred,!Sperry!Sun!monitoring!data!was!clearly!indicating!that!the!drill!
pipe!pressure!was!continuously!increasing,!rather!than!staying!the!same!or!
decreasing,!as!it!should!have!been.!However,!no!one!was!around!to!notice!this.!Had!
the!crew!detected!this!anomalous!information!when!it!became!available,!prevention!
or!control!of!the!blowout!may!have!been!possible!(National!Commission,!2011).!
Transocean!was!aware!of!the!need!for!constant!monitoring,!but!provided!its!
employees!with!no!incentive!to!abide!by!this.!!
Another!decision!made!by!Transocean!crewmembers!that!went!against!
Transocean’s!protocol!was!to!divert!mudflow!through!the!mud!gas!diverter!system,!
rather!than!overboard!as!the!Handbook!stated!(BP,!2010).!Diversion!of!the!mud!
overboard!would!have!saved!the!crew!time,!and!chances!of!ignition!on!board!the!rig!
could!have!been!reduced!(National!Commission,!2011).!The!crew!clearly!needed!
more!incentive!to!follow!Transocean!Handbook!procedures.!
!

The!failure!of!the!blowout!preventer,!technology!belonging!to!Transocean,!is!

cited!by!all!the!investigations!as!a!major!cause!of!the!blowout.!There!was!no!surface!
testing!of!this!equipment!before!drilling!began,!yet!after!the!explosion,!two!control!
pods!were!found!to!be!dysfunctional.!Testing!of!the!equipment!according!to!
regulation!would!have!detected!these!issues!(National!Commission,!2011).!
Transocean!failed!to!incentivize!its!employees!to!take!responsibility!for!equipment!
maintenance.!
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!

In!December!2009,!another!Transocean!rig!had!a!similar!incident!in!the!

North!Sea.!The!incident!was!contained,!but!it!cost!Transocean!both!time!and!money.!
Despite!learning!some!lessons!about!the!need!to!provide!more!explicit!instructions!
regarding!procedures,!such!as!negative!pressure!tests!and!well!clean!up!operations,!
Transocean!did!not!pass!on!the!lessons!to!any!of!its!employees!outside!the!incident.(
The!Deepwater(Horizon!crew!never!heard!any!of!the!advisements!set!forth!by!
Transocean.!The!advisements!included!special!instructions!for!when!only!a!single!
mechanical!barrier!is!present,!which!was!the!case!on!Deepwater(Horizon!at!the!time!
of!the!blowout!(National!Commission,!2011).!
(
5.1.8(How(can(industries(like(offshore(drilling(be(restructured(in(terms(of(
regulation(to(incentivize(all(parties(to(assume(greater(responsibility(for(their(
actions?(
!

As!it!is!currently!structured,!the!offshore!drilling!industry!involves!many!

different!agencies!with!many!different!roles!and!objectives.!Both!between!and!
within!the!agencies,!these!conflicting!objectives!lead!to!principalQagent!problems.!
Additionally,!the!way!it!is!organized!is!complex!and!distorted.!There!is!a!thin!
distribution!of!responsibility!that!allows!agencies!and!individuals!to!have!a!lesser!
sense!of!liability!for!potential!damages!and!focus!more!strongly!on!their!respective!
objectives,!which!are!usually!profitQdriven.!The!complicated!relationships!between!
companies!and!regulators,!companies!and!subcontractors,!and!companies!and!their!
employees!lead!not!only!to!deferral!of!responsibility,!but!also!to!issues!with!
communication.!!
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5.2(Proposed(Solutions!
!

Using!an!investigation!of!the!Deepwater(Horizon!disaster!as!an!example!of!

what!can!happen!in!an!industry!where!there!is!a!high!risk!for!negative!externalities,!
it!proves!impossible!to!realistically!determine!which!companies!and!individuals!can!
be!held!to!blame!for!what!went!wrong.!Complex!relationships!existed!between!the!
enforcer!(MMS)!and!operator!(BP);!between!the!operator!and!its!subcontractors!
(Transocean,!Halliburton);!and!between!companies!and!their!employees!on!site.!
Additionally,!from!a!literature!review!of!related!questions!about!industries!with!
high!risk!for!negative!externalities,!it!is!clear!that!far!too!many!nuances,!exceptions,!
and!unpredictable!elements!exist!in!the!real!world!to!determine!one!optimal!
enforcement!strategy!for!all!these!industries.!Economists!have!recommended!
various!options!for!the!best!way!to!regulate!companies!in!industries!like!offshore!oil!
drilling,!but!the!assumptions!they!make!in!order!to!do!so!are!unrealistic.!Using!the!
questions!that!arose!in!the!identification!of!agency!problems!in!Section!5.1!of!this!
Chapter!as!a!guide!for!what!must!be!resolved,!in!conjunction!with!my!evaluation!of!
the!events!that!led!to!the!biggest!accidental!oil!spill!of!all!time,!Deepwater(Horizon,!
within!the!framework!of!the!principalQagent!model,!I!have!composed!a!list!of!
potential!mechanisms!for!an!optimal!enforcement!strategy.!This!strategy!was!
created!with!the!intention!to!promote!a!stronger!safety!culture!in!these!industries!
by!resolving!principalQagent!problems!on!all!levels.!Although!certain!adjustments!
should!be!made!according!to!industry!and!scenario,!it!is!a!combination!of!these!
proposals!that!is!recommended!for!creating!an!optimal!enforcement!strategy!for!
industries!with!a!high!risk!of!negative!externalities.!

!

92!

5.2.1(What(kinds(of(incentives(can(the(government(have(to(choose(to(promote(
safety(rather(than(place(emphasis(on(making(a(profit?(
!

A!major!flaw!in!the!offshore!drilling!industry!lay!in!the!incentive!scheme!of!

MMS,!the!government!agency!in!charge!of!enforcing!a!safety!culture!and!protecting!
the!environment!from!the!operations!of!oil!drilling.!However,!the!conflicting!
responsibilities!of!collecting!revenue!from!lease!sales!with!enforcing!regulations!on!
lessees!did!not!give!MMS!enough!incentive!to!regulate!strictly!or!effectively.!In!May!
2010,!almost!immediately!after!the!Deepwater(Horizon!disaster,!MMS!was!dissolved!
("The!Reorganization,"!2010).!In!its!place,!three!separate!agencies!were!created!for!
regulation!of!the!offshore!drilling!industry.!The!Bureau!of!Ocean!Energy!
Management!was!created!“to!ensure!the!balanced!and!responsible!development!of!
energy!resources!on!the!Outer!Continental!Shelf”!("The!Reorganization,"!2010).!
Next,!the!Bureau!of!Safety!and!Environmental!Enforcement!was!created!to!“[ensure]!
safe!and!environmentally!responsible!exploration!and!production!and![enforce]!
applicable!rules!and!regulations”!("The!Reorganization,"!2010).!Third,!the!Office!of!
Natural!Resources!Revenue!was!created!to!“[ensure]!a!fair!return!to!the!taxpayer!
from!offshore!royalty!and!revenue!collection!and!disbursement!activities”!("The!
Reorganization,"!2010).!
!

As!no!direct!responsibility!can!be!placed!on!the!government!for!potential!

damages!during!offshore!drilling!operations,!splitting!MMS!into!these!branches!of!
responsibility!was!the!only!realistic!way!to!promote!incentive!within!the!
government!to!protect!the!environment.!By!removing!lease!sales!and!profit!from!the!
concerns!of!two!of!the!branches,!there!will!be!more!attention!towards!their!
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respective!resource!development!and!protection!responsibilities,!and!no!more!
conflicting!objectives.!This!reorganization!was!the!most!logical!and!effective!step!
that!could!have!been!taken!by!the!government!to!improve!the!safety!culture!in!the!
offshore!drilling!industry,!and!have!more!optimal!enforcement.!
(
5.2.2(What(incentives(can(be(given(for(experts(on(the(technicalities(and(safety(
concerns(of(industries(with(high(risk(for(negative(externalities,(like(offshore(
drilling,(to(want(to(work(as(enforcers(and(monitors(in(such(industries?(
Due!to!a!lack!of!government!financial!resources,!monetary!incentives!for!
federal!employees!of!The!Bureau!of!Ocean!Energy!Management!or!The!Bureau!of!
Safety!and!Environmental!Enforcement!are!not!an!option.!However,!if!other!third!
party!monitors!are!brought!into!the!industry,!they!might!have!the!resources!
necessary!to!attract!more!specialist!employees.!One!option!is!to!require!third!party!
insurance!for!offshore!drilling!operators,!both!to!help!cover!potential!damages!and!
act!as!a!monitor!of!operations.!Since!insurers!would!be!responsible!for!covering!
damages!should!an!incident!occur,!they!would!have!incentive!to!enforce!safe!drilling!
operations.!Private!insurance!companies!have!the!resources!available!to!pay!higher!
salaries!than!government!agencies,!thus!attracting!more!qualified!experts!to!inspect!
and!monitor!all!parts!of!the!drilling!process!(Cohen,!Gottlieb,!Linn,!&!Richardson,!
2011).!!
!
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5.2.3(What(incentives(can(be(given(to(companies,(as(agents,(within(industries(
with(high(risk(for(negative(externalities,(such(as(the(drilling(industry,(to(make(
them(act(more(cautiously?(
!

The!primary!principalQagent!relationship!in!the!offshore!drilling!industry!is!

that!between!the!enforcer!and!the!companies!involved!in!drilling!operations.!In!
order!to!provide!these!companies!with!incentive!for!taking!safety!precautions,!a!
strict!liability!standard!rather!than!a!negligence!rule!is!preferable.!Because!of!moral!
hazard!in!the!industry,!enforcers!are!unable!to!observe!every!decision!made!and!
action!taken!during!drilling!operations,!as!well!as!which!company!or!individual!is!
responsible!for!each.!As!discussed!by!Viscusi!&!Zeckhauser!(2011),!enforcement!of!a!
negligence!rule!requires!the!evaluation!of!actions!against!a!due!care!standard!
(Viscusi!&!Zeckhauser,!2011).!This!is!unrealistic!in!an!industry!with!moral!hazard.!
Even!now,!almost!four!years!after!the!Deepwater(Horizon!disaster,!BP!is!undergoing!
litigation!proceedings!to!determine!the!degree!of!blame!to!which!they!can!be!held!
accountable.!Endless!litigation!such!as!this!wastes!time,!money,!and!resources!that!
could!be!substantially!cut!back!on!if!a!strict!liability!standard!is!put!in!place.!
Additionally,!strict!liability!further!prevents!companies!from!deferral!of!
responsibility!during!operations,!since!companies!will!be!held!accountable!for!
damages,!regardless!of!the!level!of!care!they!exhibited.!Although!some!arguments!
for!how!a!negligence!rule!could!work!exist,!the!logistics!involve!assumptions!and!
rules!that!only!serve!to!complicate!relationships!between!a!principal!and!agent.!
Strict!liability!standards!are!simple,!straightforward,!and!usually!less!expensive!to!
enforce!than!a!negligence!rule!(Cohen,!1998).!!
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!

With!strict!liability,!a!liability!cap!is!important!to!set.!A!liability!cap!is!the!

amount!of!damages!a!firm!must!be!able!to!cover!in!order!to!engage!in!offshore!
drilling!operations.!The!current!liability!cap!for!the!offshore!drilling!industry!in!the!
United!States!is!$75!million.!Given!that!BP!has!already!set!aside!$42!billion!for!
covering!damages!from!the!Deepwater(Horizon!spill,!it!is!clear!that!this!liability!cap!
needs!to!be!raised!significantly.!If!a!firm!is!unable!to!cover!the!cost!of!potential!
damages!they!may!cause,!they!should!be!prevented!from!conducting!offshore!
drilling!operations.!This!leads!to!a!concern!for!smaller!firms,!which!may!not!be!able!
to!afford!a!high!cap.!However,!keeping!small!firms!in!the!industry!is!beneficial!in!a!
competitive!market,!so!there!are!several!ways!in!which!small!firms!can!be!assisted!
in!meeting!the!liability!cap!standards.!One!suggestion!is!to!set!the!cap!as!a!
percentage!of!a!given!firm’s!revenue.!However,!this!does!not!ensure!the!firm!will!be!
able!to!cover!damages!incurred.!Instead,!some!sort!of!tax!or!insurance!should!be!
required!to!help!reach!the!liability!cap!and!keep!small!firms!competitive!within!the!
industry.!Providing!small!companies!are!taxed!or!insured!up!to!the!cap,!meaning!
damages!will!be!covered,!they!will!be!permitted!to!drill!(Cohen,!Gottlieb,!Linn,!&!
Richardson,!2011).!As!previously!discussed,!third!party!insurance!provides!the!
additional!benefit!of!an!expert!to!monitor!drilling!operations,!making!it!potentially!
preferable!to!a!tax.!
!

Another!way!to!keep!small!companies!involved!is!to!assess!liability!caps!on!a!

projectQbyQproject!basis.!This!may!prevent!small!companies!from!drilling!in!the!
more!risky!deepwater!areas,!as!liability!caps!will!likely!be!higher!for!these!sites.!
However,!it!will!promote!the!drilling!of!wells!closer!to!shore!with!less!risk!of!
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damages!occurring,!as!well!as!keep!small!companies!competitive!(Cohen,!Gottlieb,!
Linn,!&!Richardson,!2011).!
!

Finally,!there!is!an!option!for!large!companies,!such!as!BP,!to!selfQinsure!on!

projects.!When!they!contract!out!to!smaller!companies,!these!companies!could!then!
provide!part!of!the!insurance.!This!scenario!keeps!all!involved!parties!responsible!
for!maintaining!safe!drilling!operations,!as!well!as!provides!a!role!for!small!
companies!to!remain!in!the!industry.!
(
5.2.4(What(kind(of(contract(can(be(designed(to(incentivize(safety(interests(
within(involved(companies((operators(and(subcontractors),(given(the(moral(
hazard(existent(in(these(industries?(
!

Another!principalQagent!relationship!existent!in!the!offshore!drilling!industry!

is!that!within!operating!companies,!which!deal!with!moral!hazard!as!well.!On!shore,!
corporate!BP!confronts!moral!hazard!with!its!employees!on!board!drilling!rigs,!and!
subcontractors!suffer!from!the!same.!When!devising!a!contract,!the!principal!must!
take!moral!hazard!into!account!and!provide!incentives!to!agents!accordingly.!One!
way!to!design!such!a!contract!is!to!allow!for!third!party!observability.!Although!an!
agent’s!actions!are!not!observable,!some!kind!of!results!can!be!required!that!will!
imply!the!agent’s!actions!and!effort!level!(Newman!&!Wright,!1992).!These!could!
include!holding!employees!on!board!drilling!rigs!liable!for!specific!failings!on!board!
the!rig,!dependent!on!their!role.!
!

With!moral!hazard,!some!degree!of!monitoring!is!necessary.!It!might!be!in!

the!best!interest!of!drilling!companies!to!hire!someone!specifically!for!this!role!who!
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would!be!present!on!board!drilling!rigs!at!all!times,!giving!employees!incentive!to!
exercise!their!best!efforts.!Similar!to!Cohen’s!(1998)!idea!for!holding!certain!
employees!liable!for!environmental!damages!and!on!a!fixed!wage!contract,!this!
monitor!would!not!be!responsible!for!making!any!decisions!regarding!drilling!
operations.!He!would!not!have!incentive!to!perform!operations!in!a!timely!or!costQ
saving!manner,!but!only!to!prevent!any!employees!from!falling!short!of!the!expected!
standard!of!care,!as!this!kind!of!shortcoming!would!reflect!back!on!him!(Cohen,!
1998).!This!selfQmonitoring!would!be!cheaper!and!more!effective!than!third!party!
monitoring,!and!would!divert!monitoring!costs!onto!the!operating!company,!rather!
than!the!government.!!
!

When!devising!incentive!contracts,!the!question!of!positive!or!negative!

incentives!arises.!With!properly!designed!incentives,!employees!will!exert!their!best!
efforts,!avoiding!the!problems!that!come!with!moral!hazard.!In!industries!where!
level!of!production!is!key,!bonus!contracts!are!more!efficient!than!penalty!contracts.!
As!discussed!by!Lazear!(1998),!under!bonus!schemes!a!critical!level!of!effort!must!
be!reached,!and!reducing!effort!below!a!certain!point!has!no!cost.!Additionally,!
individuals!are!psychologically!more!attracted!to!bonuses!for!extra!effort!than!
penalties!for!not!reaching!a!certain!standard!(Lazear,!1998).!Miller!&!Whitford!
(2007)!propose!a!pure!incentive!contract!providing!a!flat!wage!high!enough!for!the!
agent!to!accept,!plus!a!bonus!when!high!levels!of!effort!are!displayed.!They!believe!
these!kinds!of!incentives!will!promote!the!alignment!of!selfQinterested!behavior!with!
efficient!allocation!in!principalQagent!relationships.!According!to!Miller!&!Whitford!
(2007),!when!the!actions!of!agents!have!a!large!effect!on!the!outcome!of!the!final!
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product,!a!principal!is!more!likely!to!provide!a!bonus!high!enough!to!incentivize!the!
agent!to!exert!sufficient!effort!(Miller!&!Whitford,!2007).!In!the!case!of!the!offshore!
drilling!industry,!the!actions!of!workers!on!board!drilling!rigs!are!critical!for!
production,!and!thus!a!contract!providing!a!bonus!would!be!the!optimal!choice.!
Monitors!on!board!drilling!rigs!could!be!responsible!for!assigning!bonuses.!
!
5.2.5(What(kind(of(contract(can(an(operator,(like(BP,(draw(up(with(its(
contracted(subsidiaries(to(hold(them(more(accountable(for(performing(their(
duties(with(due(care?((
!

A!third!principalQagent!relationship!that!exists!in!the!offshore!drilling!

industry!is!that!between!drilling!site!operators!and!their!subcontracted!companies.!
If!BP!had!been!held!strictly!liable!for!all!potential!damages!at!the!Macondo!well!site,!
they!would!have!had!incentive!to!contract!out!responsibility!for!parts!of!this!liability!
to!subcontractors!as!they!hired!them.!With!this!kind!of!topQdown!incentive!scheme,!
each!involved!company!would!feel!responsible!for!their!actions!and!avoid!making!
decisions!that!might!lead!to!a!scenario!in!which!they!would!need!to!make!large!
damage!payments.!The!government!would!hold!operators!responsible,!and!in!turn,!
operators!would!hold!subcontractors!partially!responsible.!Issues!with!damage!
payments!and!cleanup!costs!would!be!determined!between!an!operator!and!its!
subcontractors,!rather!than!through!the!government,!again!internalizing!these!extra!
costs.!
!
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5.2.6(How(can(industries(like(offshore(drilling(be(restructured(in(terms(of(
regulation(to(incentivize(all(parties(to(assume(greater(responsibility(for(their(
actions?(
!

As!it!now!exists,!the!offshore!oil!drilling!industry!is!full!of!complex,!multiQ

layered!relationships!that!allow!for!deferral!of!responsibility!and!a!lack!of!
accountability.!To!build!an!optimal!enforcement!strategy,!the!industry!must!be!
restructured!through!simplifying!the!scenario.!The!relationships!between!involved!
parties!must!be!clearly!defined!from!the!outset,!with!contracts!stipulating!exactly!
what!each!party!is!responsible!for!on!a!given!project.!In!these!contracts,!there!are!
two!potential!liability!schemes!that!will!disallow!parties!from!evading!responsibility!
for!their!actions.!!
First,!one!firm!could!be!held!strictly!liable!for!all!potential!damages!from!the!
outset.!In!the!case!of!Deepwater(Horizon,!this!would!have!meant!BP!signing!a!
contract!with!MMS!when!their!lease!for!the!Macondo!well!site!was!granted,!
accepting!full!liability!for!any!damages!incurred,!no!matter!who!the!company!felt!
was!internally!at!fault!(Viscusi!&!Zeckhauser,!2011).!For!example,!BP!would!not!
have!been!able!to!blame!Halliburton!for!the!failure!of!their!cement!to!seal!the!well.!
Through!their!initial!contract!with!MMS,!BP!would!have!been!held!responsible!for!
this!as!they!made!the!decision!to!contract!Halliburton!and!approved!the!cement!
design!and!installation.!Since!drilling!companies!would!probably!be!wary!of!such!a!
strict!liability!contract,!they!would!have!the!option!to!defer!certain!responsibilities!
to!subcontractors!in!their!respective!contracts.!Although!MMS!would!hold!BP!
strictly!liable!for!the!damages!of!the!Macondo!well!blowout,!if!BP!had!specified!
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which!parts!of!operations!its!subcontractors,!such!as!Transocean!and!Halliburton,!
would!be!held!accountable!for!should!an!accident!occur,!BP!could!subsequently!hold!
these!companies!liable!for!helping!to!cover!parts!of!their!cleanup!and!penalty!costs!
from!MMS.!For!example,!BP!could!stipulate!that!if!the!cement!provided!by!
Halliburton!failed!to!effectively!seal!the!well,!Halliburton!would!be!responsible!for!
covering!a!percentage!of!damage!costs!incurred.!!
An!alternate!liability!scheme!that!could!be!implemented!would!be!to!hold!all!
firms!involved!in!a!project!equally!liable!for!damages.!This!would!still!require!an!
initial!operator!to!take!on!liability!responsibilities!when!it!was!leased!a!site!by!the!
government,!but!as!the!operator!subcontracted!responsibilities!to!various!
corporations,!these!companies!would!also!need!to!sign!liability!contracts!with!the!
government.!Should!an!accident!occur,!each!company!would!pay!the!damages!in!full,!
meaning!each!would!feel!fully!liable!for!their!actions!(Segerson,!1988).!Without!the!
ability!to!defer!responsibility,!each!company!would!promote!safe!behavior.!Because!
some!firms!are!involved!on!a!very!small!level!with!a!project,!it!could!be!at!the!
discretion!of!the!initial!operator!to!determine!which!subcontractors!should!be!held!
fully!liable.!!
!
5.2.7(Can(these(strategies(be(applied(to(industries(with(high(risk(for(negative(
externalities(outside(the(offshore(drilling(industry?(
!

Although!this!search!for!the!optimal!enforcement!strategy!has!been!

conducted!in!regards!to!the!offshore!drilling!industry,!and!specifically,!the!
Deepwater(Horizon!disaster,!proposals!for!the!resolution!of!principalQagent!
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problems!in!this!industry!can!be!applied!to!other!industries!with!high!risk!for!
negative!externalities.!Different!strategies!will!work!better!than!others,!subject!to!
the!exact!structure!of!the!industry!and!the!companies!within!that!industry.!
However,!the!basic!roles!of!enforcers,!operators,!and!subcontractors,!as!well!as!the!
issue!of!moral!hazard!in!principalQagent!relationships!are!general!concepts!that!
exist!in!many!industries.!
!

Enforcement!agencies!for!any!industry!can!be!divided!into!entities!with!

separate!responsibilities!regarding!safety!and!profits,!strengthening!incentives!for!
and!attention!towards!enforcement!of!safety!regulations.!In!order!to!incentivize!
companies!within!risky!industries!to!avoid!negative!externalities,!there!must!be!a!
liability!scheme!in!place.!Proposals!such!as!raising!the!liability!cap!and!holding!
companies!responsible!for!damages!up!to!this!amount!would!serve!as!strong!
incentive!for!cautious!behavior!and!decisionQmaking!across!industries.!As!in!the!
drilling!industry,!many!industries!involve!the!subcontracting!of!various!services,!so!
holding!one!company!strictly!liable!for!a!project!helps!provide!greater!incentive!for!
safe!operations.!Additionally,!this!cuts!back!drastically!on!litigation!costs!following!
accidents.!While!strict!liability!is!preferable!to!a!negligence!rule!in!the!drilling!
industry,!there!may!be!some!industries!with!negative!externalities!that!could!be!
better!served!by!a!negligence!rule.!However,!most!of!these!industries!have!issues!
with!moral!hazard,!and!would!thus!be!well!suited!to!strict!liability.!
Suggestions!for!resolution!of!moral!hazard!in!the!drilling!industry!are!also!
applicable!outside!the!industry,!with!options!including!third!party!observability!and!
selfQmonitoring!effective!for!most!industries!with!moral!hazard!problems.!The!
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decision!of!whether!to!use!positive!or!negative!incentives!in!contracts!is!one!that!is!
more!dependent!on!industry.!However,!in!any!industry!that!has!emphasis!on!
production,!like!the!drilling!industry,!bonus!schemes!would!be!preferable.!
Due!to!the!risks!involved!in!operations!in!these!industries,!third!party!
insurance!could!be!required,!or!at!least!offered,!as!a!way!to!cover!liability!for!
companies!with!insubstantial!internal!resources.!Third!party!insurance!has!the!
additional!benefit!of!providing!an!expert!third!party!monitor!in!conjunction!with!
monitoring!by!the!enforcement!agency!for!an!industry.!!
Overall,!the!majority!of!proposals!submitted!to!form!an!optimal!enforcement!
strategy!for!the!drilling!industry!can!be!applied!generally!across!industries!with!
high!risk!for!negative!externalities.!!
!
!
!

!
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Chapter(VI(
Conclusion(
(
The!world!is!full!of!uncertainty—no!one!can!predict!a!future!in!which!
unprecedented!events!occur!regularly.!As!the!world!and!humankind!continue!to!
develop!and!grow,!there!will!always!be!unusual!circumstances!and!happenings!that!
go!beyond!the!wildest!imaginings.!Unfortunately,!it!is!often!these!extraordinary!
circumstances!or!catastrophic!events!that!move!people!to!action.!Rather!than!
preempt!the!worstQcase!scenario,!people!have!a!tendency!to!slip!into!a!comfortable!
carelessness!until!the!worst!occurs.!!
It!is!common!knowledge!that!offshore!drilling!is!a!risky!practice,!especially!
with!its!recent!shift!to!deeper!and!lessQcharted!waters.!Appropriately,!from!
protecting!the!environment!to!protecting!the!lives!of!those!working!on!rigs,!the!
government!and!the!drilling!industry!alike!have!always!had!extensive!rules!and!
protocols!in!place.!Major!oil!spills!have!occurred!in!the!past,!but!as!time!puts!
distance!between!such!disasters!and!the!present,!the!tendency!to!skimp!on!the!fine!
print!of!regulations!emerges.!Both!government!regulators!and!drilling!industry!
companies!suffer!from!becoming!too!comfortable—as!years!go!by!without!incident,!
attention!to!detail!deteriorates,!and!some!steps!in!ensuring!safety!are!skipped.!!
The!events!surrounding!the!Deepwater(Horizon!disaster!are!an!example!of!
this!tendency.!Through!an!investigation!of!the!disaster,!it!became!clear!that!fault!lay!
with!every!level!of!the!industry:!from!the!enforcing!government!agency,!MMS;!to!the!
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operator!on!the!site,!BP;!to!its!subcontractors,!Transocean!and!Halliburton;!to!
individual!employees!of!the!companies.!With!a!lack!of!attention!to!safety!protocol!
and!regulations!within!the!industry,!all!parties!were!to!blame!for!the!disaster.!The!
worstQcase!scenario!occurred,!spurring!the!need!for!reform.!As!much!as!is!
realistically!possible,!an!event!like!this!must!be!prevented!from!happening!again.!
Analysis!of!the!principalQagent!model!proved!extremely!helpful!in!providing!
a!framework!for!examining!the!flaws!within!the!offshore!drilling!industry.!Problems!
with!contractual!relationships,!incentives,!and!asymmetrical!information!became!
evident!on!every!level!of!the!offshore!drilling!industry,!and!specifically!in!the!
Deepwater(Horizon!incident.!However,!due!to!the!complicated!nature!of!the!industry!
and!the!various!relationships!involved!in!any!given!drilling!project,!applications!of!
typical!resolutions!for!principalQagent!problems!were!not!straightforward.!The!
problems!needed!to!be!resolved,!but!in!the!context!of!the!circumstances!unique!to!
the!offshore!drilling!industry.!This!included!the!need!for!the!enforcing!agency,!MMS,!
to!incentivize!a!safety!culture!amongst!its!agents.!In!principalQagent!literature,!it!is!
assumed!that!a!principal!will!be!motivated!to!produce!the!socially!optimal!outcome.!
However,!this!was!not!the!case!for!MMS,!a!principal!without!a!true!financial!stake!in!
the!industry,!charged!with!regulating,!but!not!owning!or!profiting!in!the!enterprise.!
Royalties!collected!by!MMS!went!into!the!National!Treasury,!benefiting!the!
government,!but!not!directly!profiting!their!agency.!
Additional!review!of!relevant!literature!on!this!model!as!applied!to!industries!
with!high!risk!for!negative!externalities!and!with!potential!for!moral!hazard!helped!
in!piecing!together!the!optimal!set!of!incentives!for!the!offshore!drilling!industry.!
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Because!the!Deepwater(Horizon!disaster!is!a!contemporary!event,!little!literature!yet!
exists!dealing!with!it!from!this!perspective.!However,!there!is!literature!on!topics!
such!as!moral!hazard!within!the!offshore!drilling!industry,!and!on!the!principalQ
agent!model!applied!to!Coast!Guard!regulation!of!oilrig!transfers!in!coastal!waters.!
No!literature!yet!suggests!the!set!of!incentives!that!would!be!an!optimal!
enforcement!strategy!for!the!offshore!drilling!industry,!but!by!taking!pertinent!
information!and!research!from!various!sources,!application!of!strategies!to!the!
industry!became!possible.!!
Since!the!industry!and!the!relationships!of!agencies!within!it!are!by!their!
very!nature!complex,!suggestions!for!components!of!an!optimal!enforcement!
strategy!must!account!for!intricate!layers!of!authority.!The!relationships!must!be!
simplified!by!specifically!defining!responsibilities!from!the!outset!of!any!project.!
Beginning!at!the!top,!this!means!providing!the!enforcing!agency!with!incentive!to!
enforce!regulations.!Following!the!Deepwater(Horizon(disaster,!MMS!was!broken!up!
into!three!branches!to!resolve!its!conflicting!objectives!of!profit!and!regulation,!
providing!the!first!step!toward!necessary!reform.!Additionally,!the!government’s!
role!as!an!enforcer!is!hampered!by!a!lack!of!resources!to!attract!the!most!qualified!
employees!for!enforcing!regulations!and!reviewing!the!proposals!submitted!by!
drilling!companies.!To!resolve!this,!third!party!insurance!is!suggested!to!provide!a!
third!party!monitor!with!ample!means!to!employ!experts!in!the!field.!On!the!next!
rung!of!authority!are!companies!that!act!as!chief!operators!for!drilling!sites.!In!order!
to!incentivize!these!companies!to!promote!a!culture!of!safety!among!their!agents,!
the!government!should!hold!them!strictly!liable!for!all!damages.!Strict!liability!is!less!
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costly!to!enforce!than!a!negligence!rule,!and!avoids!the!problems!with!moral!hazard!
in!the!industry!that!a!negligence!rule!would!face.!If!an!operator!is!held!strictly!liable,!
they!will!have!incentive!to!devise!contracts!with!their!subsidiaries!that!will!hold!
them!accountable!as!well.!With!this!incentive!to!follow!protocol,!companies!involved!
in!drilling!projects!must!then!incentivize!their!employees!by!making!them!feel!
liable.!Devising!a!contract!that!allows!for!third!party!oversight!of!agents’!efforts!
assists!with!resolving!moral!hazard!issues,!as!well!as!provides!a!kind!of!selfQ
monitor.!Additionally,!for!industries!such!as!this!in!which!production!is!key,!a!pure!
incentive!contract!with!a!sufficient!flat!wage!plus!a!bonus!for!higher!levels!of!effort!
is!efficient.!Only!in!conjunction!with!each!other!can!these!various!layers!of!
incentives!have!the!potential!to!compose!an!optimal!enforcement!strategy!for!the!
offshore!drilling!industry.!
After!an!examination!of!the!characteristics!of!the!offshore!drilling!industry!
that!required!different!aspects!of!enforcement,!more!general!conclusions!were!
determined.!As!an!industry!with!high!risk!for!negative!externalities,!issues!with!
principalQagent!relationships,!issues!with!moral!hazard,!and!an!inherent!conflict!
between!promotion!of!a!safety!culture!and!profitQmaximization,!the!offshore!drilling!
industry!has!much!in!common!with!many!other!industries.!Thus,!the!possible!pieces!
of!the!optimal!enforcement!strategy!proposed!by!this!thesis!can!be!transferred!and!
applied,!either!wholly!or!in!part,!to!industries!with!similar!characteristics!to!those!
listed!above.!
In!reality,!every!industry,!company,!and!individual!project!is!unique.!In!order!
to!make!suggestions!for!an!optimal!enforcement!strategy!for!industries!with!high!
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risk!for!negative!externalities,!research!criteria!had!to!be!narrowed.!The!Deepwater(
Horizon(case!study!was!chosen!because!the!offshore!drilling!industry!is!a!prominent!
example!of!this!kind!of!industry,!and!Deepwater(Horizon!is!a!prominent!example!of!a!
worstQcase!scenario!within!this!industry.!The!enforcement!strategy!devised!
inherently!has!a!bias!towards!applying!to!this!incident!and!industry.!Given!more!
time,!this!thesis!could!be!expanded!to!include!additional!case!studies!from!both!the!
offshore!drilling!industry!and!other!industries!with!high!risk!for!negative!
externalities.!Through!comparison!within!and!across!industries,!more!universally!
applicable!components!for!an!optimal!enforcement!strategy!could!be!developed.!
However,!due!to!differences!between!industries,!there!can!be!some!benefit!to!
devising!an!enforcement!strategy!on!a!smaller!scale!such!as!this.!
!
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